

"LEADERS WHO GO CRAZY"

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ABSTRACT

This paper has a look at the various forces which may drive a leader "crazy." The development of narcissism is reviewed. Attention is paid to the dangers of excessive narcissism. In addition, some of the psychological pressures which affect leaders are discussed. It is argued that leaders are susceptible to a cycle of grandiosity, group think, paranoid thinking, identification with the aggressor, scapegoating, and ruin. As an illustration, the case of Saddam Hussein is presented.

I see heads before my eyes that are ripe and ready
for my sword to pluck them. And I see blood glistening
between the turbans and the beards.

Al-Hadjadj bin Yusuf al-Thaqafi

Governor of Kufa and Basra (Iraq), AD 694

Saddam Hussein's role as immediate instigator of the great upheaval in the Middle East has given rise in many people's minds to the question of what kind of person he is. What makes such an individual "tick"? What are his motivations? How can we explain what he is doing? Because of the bizarreness of much of his behavior, some political analysts have even asked themselves whether the man has not simply gone crazy: is this leader of a nation still in possession of all his senses? Others, of course, deny that there is anything wrong with him. They argue that he merely operates by a very different set of rules than those of us brought up in Western societies.

The case of Saddam Hussein, however, brings us to the interesting question of what makes a leader "go crazy." What kind of psychological processes are we talking about when leaders start to act strangely? What are the key ingredients which push a person over the brink? How does it all happen and where does it start?

A really facetious commentator would argue that the "recipe" for a person to go crazy is relatively simple. First and most importantly, one has to start early in life (as a matter of fact, the earlier, the better). Child psychologists have pointed out that the first three years of life are particularly critical to the development of the person (Spitz, 1965; Mahler, Pine & Bergman 1975). These are the years during which the core patterns of the personality are shaped; it is the period when we emerge as a person with a sense of our body, a name, a mind, and a personal history. The foundations are put in place for the kind of person we are going to be, and are likely to remain.

In this process of growing up, a critical factor is how the developing child deals with the question of narcissism. I am referring to the way in which a person will value his or herself--how strong his or her sense is of whom he or she is going to be.

For many of us, the term narcissism has a somewhat derogatory connotation. This is because in more general usage it may stand for egotism, self-centeredness, or an exaggerated self-love. And who wants to be compared to that unfortunate young man, the mythological figure "Narcissus" who fell in love with his own reflection?

Narcissism, however, is much more than that. It also refers to a stage of infantile development we all have to surmount, a stage during which the growing child derives pleasure from his or her own body and its functions. The kind of treatment received during this critical period of development will very much color the child's (and later the adult's) way of dealing with the world.

Narcissism is a strange thing, a double-edged sword. Too much and too little of it can both create problems. When the balance is lost, instability in the core of a person's

personality may occur. We must remember that narcissistic elements help constitute the base of self-esteem and identity.

A sense of who one is and what one is able to do is only gradually acquired through interaction with the environment, initially limited to the primary care-takers. In this process the developing child will inevitably encounter a considerable amount of frustration. After all, no parent is perfect! Unfortunately, becoming a person is not at all like that seemingly comfortable period of intra-uterine existence where everything was automatically taken care of.

The degree of frustration experienced naturally depends on the kind of parenting the child gets. For normal development, frustration should occur in tolerable doses. If not, this may come to haunt the person later in life.

As a way of coping with the shortcomings of parental care, and in an attempt to ward off frustration, the child likes to retain the original experience of perfection and bliss in his early years by creating both a grandiose, exhibitionistic image of his self and an all-powerful, idealized image of his parent (the latter taking on the role of savior and protector). Psychoanalysts call these two narcissistic configurations the "grandiose self" and the "idealized parent image" (Kohut, 1971, 1977). Over time, in the case of what we can call "good enough" care, these two configurations will be tamed by the forces of reality. Parents, siblings and other important figures will modify the child's exhibitionistic displays, channeling grandiose fantasies of power and glory in proper directions, thus laying the foundation for well-grounded ambition, stable values, well-defined career interests, and a secure sense of self-esteem and identity.

Of course, what is described above is an ideal scenario. Unfortunately, many things can go wrong in the process of growing up. In some situations, prolonged disappointment due to parental overstimulation, understimulation, or highly inconsistent, arbitrary behavior can lead to problems of a narcissistic nature. And if violence and abuse are part and parcel of the "package," the stage is set for an "inner theater" complete with malevolent imagery. In the case of public figures, these destructive "scenes" of the inner theatre may be acted out on a world stage later in life (Lasswell,1930; Zaleznik & Kets de Vries 1985).

Children who have been exposed to these types of parenting may come to believe that they cannot rely on anyone's love or loyalty. As adults, they will act according to their expectations.

Here we are talking about people who, in spite of their pretension of being self-sufficient, are troubled in the depth of their being by a sense of deprivation, anger and emptiness. In order to cope with these feelings, and perhaps as a cover for their insecurity, the narcissistic type of needs will turn into an obsession. Such individuals fixate on issues of power, beauty, status, prestige, and superiority. They continually use others to strengthen their own shaky sense of self-esteem. They are also preoccupied with thoughts of getting even for the experienced hurts (real or imagined) of childhood.

How does one recognize such people? Actually, it's not all that difficult. Let us look at some of the indicators. To start off, these people tend to have a grandiose sense of self-importance. They habitually take advantage of others in order to achieve their own ends. They also live under the illusion that their problems are unique. Then there is a sense of entitlement, the feeling that they deserve especially favorable treatment and that the rules set for others don't apply to them. Furthermore, they are addicted to compliments--they can never get enough. They lack empathy, being unable to experience how others feel. Last

but certainly not least, their envy of others and their rage when hampered in fulfilling their wishes can be formidable (APA,1987).

The previous discussion gives some idea about the process of creating "crazy leaders." But before we go any further, there is one important caveat. As indicated earlier, narcissism is not necessarily bad--it is part and parcel of life. Without a certain degree of narcissism, it would be very hard for anybody to function. Particularly for people in positions of leadership, a healthy dose of narcissism is very important. Narcissism is the engine that drives people to participate in political and organizational life. It is the motivator which makes things happen. What is important here is that there does exist a positive form of narcissistic behavior based on a secure sense of self-esteem and identity, and a clear understanding of whom one is and what one is able to do.

"Narcissists" of this type have the capacity for introspection; they radiate a sense of positive vitality and know what feelings of empathy are all about. This is quite a contrast with those other types of narcissists who are continually trying to boost a defective sense of self-esteem and are preoccupied with envy, spite, settling accounts or attaining a vindictive triumph over others (Kets de Vries, 1989).

The next thing we should keep in mind in the molding of leaders is that the climb to the top usually implies a lengthy period of deference, a time during which the person in question somehow has to control his "blind" ambitions. This is a tough assignment for a person who has problems centered on narcissism. It necessitates a capacity for being a kind of actor: having the ability to put on a mask and knowing how to play the role. Of course, given the tendency to "split," to divide the world and the people around into "good" and "bad" categories, such a person may be "lucky" and find a mentor that fits his or her "ideal" image. In this case the act of sycophancy will not be so much of a hardship.

Suppose the individual's charm--false as it may be in many instances--has paid off. Suppose his play acting has finally enabled him to reach the top position. What comes next?

Unfortunately, as many leaders have found out the hard way, being on top is not necessarily a bed of roses. In spite of all the hoopla, the symbols, and the perks which may come with the office, there is also a great deal of pressure. Firstly, trite as it may sound, there is the problem concerning the loneliness of command. The moment one becomes the "top dog" the network of old relationships is disturbed. Every move has a great amount of symbolism attached. If a leader has to make critical decisions about peoples' careers he or she cannot be as close to old colleagues as was once the case. Whether the new leader likes it or not, some distance must be taken. And this is not always going to be easy. After all, leaders still have their own dependency needs and who is going to take care of them? This may cause a considerable amount of stress and frustration.

Then there is another troublesome problem and that concerns envy. Who hasn't heard of the "tall poppy syndrome"? Many people may look at the power, status and perks which come with the job and become quite envious. Others' envy can become very disconcerting and may awake dormant paranoia. In paranoid thinking illusions of grandeur and delusions of persecution go hand in hand. There is the fear--not unreasonable given the circumstances--that others will try to take away that which took so much effort to achieve. The "angst" of losing the power of office can be a considerable drain on a leader.

There are other problems with the people below in the hierarchy. A cynic once said that the moment you reach the top is the last time you will hear the truth from your subordinates!

Let us remember the grandiose self and the idealized parental image in the context of the development of self-esteem. Since each of us has had such experiences, remnants of these feelings linger on in everybody. And these feelings may come alive vis-a-vis people in a position of authority.

In dealing with authority figures, people can get "confused" in time and place. In this context Freud talked about a "false connection" (Breuer & Freud, 1893-1895), meaning that followers may not perceive and respond to leaders according to the facts of the situation but as if the leader were a significant figure from the past such as parent, other caretaker, or sibling. Ancient conflicts will be played out on the stage of the present as the legacy of the past pushes followers to displace many of their hopes and fantasies onto present leaders. A frequent pattern is that followers will try to please their leaders in any way they can think of.

The need to idealize is likely to find a very receptive response, particularly with narcissistic personalities. Leaders of this type welcome the outpouring of applause and admiration. Even worse, they may eventually no longer be able to function without this kind of "fix."

Of course, the existence of such a "mutual admiration society" can create a lot of energy in the system. It can be very useful in aligning and energizing subordinates in order to enact a common vision. The leader's ability to change what were once only fantasies into reality adds to the heady experience of being on top.

The danger of this form of interaction is that the leader may find himself in a hall of mirrors, only hearing and seeing what he wants to hear or see. And, even worse, if people

don't oblige--if the followers are unwilling to share the leader's view of the world--he may throw tantrums, re-enacting patterns of childlike behavior. The leader will perceive noncompliance as a direct attack on the very essence of his personality, given his very fragile sense of self-esteem. Past feelings of helplessness and humiliation may be revived, leading to blind rage. But this time, given the power he wields, there is a great difference. The impact of his rage on his immediate environment can be formidable.

Predictably, such outbursts of rage will intimidate the followers; it will lead to regressive, childlike behavior and a climate of dependency. As mentioned earlier, the leader's world actually becomes a very simple one: you are either for him or against him. It is a world of black and white only; there is no room for nuances. In such an environment there is no place for independent thinkers, and people who have a mind of their own cannot survive in the inner circle. Those who do not collaborate quickly turn into the new villains; such "deviants" are assigned an inferior, sub-human status and will be subjected to the leader's wrath.

Most people will quickly fall in line and share the leader's indignation toward those unwilling to share his outlook, fearful of his awesome rage. It is much better for one's physical and mental health to toe the line and "identify with the aggressor" (Freud, 1966). Actually, doing so solves two problems. In the first place, compliance with the leader's way of thinking diminishes the possibility that his wrath will be directed toward oneself. Second, identifying with the aggressor is also a way of resolving one's sense of helplessness vis-a-vis the leader; feeling close, as it were--becoming part of the leader--creates the illusion of being more powerful oneself.

This process of "identifying with the aggressor," this inducement to participate in a form of "group think," doesn't come without certain rites of passage. One is the not-so-subtle

pressure to participate in the aggression directed toward those unwilling to share the leader's vision of the world. Unfortunately, we can all too often observe how followers will eagerly share in whatever atrocities the leader engages, going even beyond the call of duty. Sharing the guilt becomes a sign of commitment. And, given the outlook of such leaders, there is a continuous stream of people to be made into villains: the world of this type of leader will always be filled with "evildoers." The tendency to engage in paranoid thinking--the idea that there are people plotting against them--is a common characteristic among such leaders. Not surprisingly, given their behavior and actions, the idea of people hatching plots will often turn into a self-fulfilling prophecy.

Most followers will oblige all demands, torn simultaneously by love and awe for the leader. Group revenge is enacted on the many handy scapegoats when things don't work out the way the leader would like them to. Paradoxically, these scapegoats fulfill an important function in that they become to others the external stabilizers of identity and inner control. They are tangible entities, a point of reference on which to project everything one is afraid of, everything that is perceived as bad and evil.

This kind of development is a frightening scenario which can have various outcomes. It can lead to complete self-destruction for an organization or, in the case of a national leader, the end of a country. It is quite likely that the process will be accompanied by some kind of bloodbath, as the need for scapegoats accelerates when things don't work out according to the leader's desires.

In such situations there may come a point when sharing the delusions of the leader may no longer be possible. The price for remaining on good terms with the leader has become too high. The end game may include a mutiny whereby the leader is overthrown as the cycle of terror becomes unbearable. Followers may come to realize that, on the insatiable

altar of the leader's wrath, they may be the next to be sacrificed. The attempt to remove the leader becomes a desperate way both to save one's neck and break the magic spell.

When we look back in history, we can see many examples of this cycle of grandiosity, group think, identification with the aggressor, scapegoating, and ruin. Hitler, Stalin, Mussolini, Ceausescu, Saddam Hussein and Mengistu Haile Mariam of Ethiopia are good examples. But let us have a look at the case of Saddam Hussein.

THE INNER THEATER OF SADDAM HUSSEIN

In spite of all the media hype, we actually don't know very much about Saddam Hussein. Given what we do know about the Iraqi propaganda machine it is clear that he has been actively involved in creating his own myth--probably for good reason. The sources available indicate that it seems to have been a childhood filled with abuse and violence. Adding to the confusion about Saddam's background is the fact that much of the information available about him appears to be contradictory.

We do know, however, that Saddam Hussein was born in 1937, a dirt-poor peasant boy, in the desert town of Tikrit (Darwish & Alexander,1991; Rayski,1991; Karsh and Rautsi, 1991). With respect to his birth it is interesting to mention that his name means "clasher," "the one who confronts," an ominous sign for things to come. Some sources say that Saddam's father had died (others say he was murdered) before the child was born. Other sources state merely that the father disappeared. Whatever the real story may be, the common ground is that he was not around. As if that was not enough, according to other witnesses Saddam seems to have been an unwanted child. Not only was he unwanted by

his stepfather, but his mother (who was mourning her oldest son who had just died) shared that feeling (Waldman, 1991, p.1). All in all, it was not a very good start for the child.

Elements of Saddam Hussein's background come through in the fairytale-like story, repeated over and over again in the media, of a childhood filled with social hardship: how he was a rebel against the family, and how, in spite of adversity, his perseverance finally paid off (Matar, 1981). But what a Faustian bargain he made!

According to the official myth, Saddam Hussein left home at the age of eight to study, against the will of his relatives who wanted him to become a farmer. There is a surprising twist to this story. Other relatives encouraged him in his wish to become a student during his journey to Tikrit. (After his mother had remarried they moved to a small village near Tikrit.) Not only did they applaud his decision, but they gave him a pistol and sent him off by car. Packing a pistol at such a young age may be seen as a foreboding sign of the future career of violence in store for the young man. From Iraqi television we learn that at the age of ten he was already very familiar with guns.

Given Saddam Hussein's repeated referral to the relationship between oppressor and oppressed and how the "infidels and criminals" will succumb to the "soldiers of faith," we can be sure that his youth was not a bed of roses. A dead or absent parent can be a formidable burden for a young child, a situation aggravated by the feeling of not being wanted. A sense of helplessness, guilt, and anger may be among the emotions which come to the fore. There was also the violence Saddam underwent at the hands of his stepfather, "Hussein the liar," who, according to some sources, treated him abusively and called him names like "son of a whore" or "son of a dog," prevented him from acquiring an education and sent him out to steal (Miller & Mylroie, 1990, p.27). Although we can only speculate, Saddam's running away from home, his carrying of an iron rod under his cloth at all times

on the way to school (which he would heat up and use to kill dogs), and his preoccupation with guns are all symptomatic of the kind of tremendous inner turbulence he was experiencing. Getting even, in this case for real wrongdoings, may have become more than an obsession with the boy.

There is usually not much hope that a person with such a disadvantaged background will make something out of his life. If, in spite of all this, hopelessness and helplessness do not prevail and the person rises to the occasion, it is usually because someone has taken an interest in the developing child, keeping him as it were mentally alive. In the case of Saddam Hussein that person was his mother's brother, Khayrallah Tulfah, a schoolteacher in Bagdad, probably the uncle who took him in after he had run away from home (Miller & Mylroie, 1990). According to some sources, this was the uncle who raised him for a while until his mother, who had no means of support, had remarried (Kursh & Rautsi, 1991).

Khayrallah had been thrown out of the Iraqi army because of his role in a pro-Nazi coup suppressed by the British, which led to his lasting enmity for Britain and "imperialism." It could be predicted, given the influence of Khayrallah on young Saddam Hussein, that we would find exactly the same feelings in the latter.

Saddam Hussein wanted to become a military officer like his uncle. Here we must note that a military career was the main means of upward mobility in Iraq at that time. To his great disappointment, Saddam's poor grades kept him out of Bagdad's Military Academy. To make up for that, when he later came into power he proclaimed himself a field marshal.

While Saddam Hussein was growing up, Iraq went through extremely turbulent times. Coups and counter-coups were the order of the day; plotting seemed to be a national pastime. For a young man with Saddam's inclinations, it doesn't come as a surprise that

political intrigue quickly took the place of schoolwork. Plotting became for him a way of life. In 1956, Saddam Hussein participated in an abortive coup against the Baghdad monarchy.

A year later, at the age of twenty, he joined the Ba'th Party, which was to become the state's political organization. This party professes some kind of socialist pan-Arabic ideology but actually is based on ideas of German national socialism and Italian fascism. From his school years onward Saddam Hussein seems to have had no real personal life outside the Ba'th Party.

However, Saddam Hussein's initial claim to fame (and here he was joined by his uncle), was being a hitman trying to assassinate General Qassim. The official story looks at it a little bit differently. The Iraqi media refer to his willingness to make sacrifices to the point of martyrdom in order to end an unacceptable regime. It is here that myth and man merge in an (apparently fabricated) tale of fearlessness, shrewdness, loyalty to his party and comrades, and iron discipline.

When the Ba'th party came to power, after eliminating the then ruler General Qassim, Saddam Hussein was promoted to the Regional Command Council. Here he found his real calling, as he was put in charge of a special force responsible for terror and assassination. He became an interrogator and torturer in the Qasr al-Nihayyat ("the Palace of the End"), so named because it was the place where King Faisal and his family had been gunned down. Saddam Hussein set about building up the party's internal security apparatus, the Jihaz Haneen, or "instrument of yearning." Killing became a full-time job (Al-Khalil, 1989).

Saddam Hussein assigned himself the title Deputy Secretary-General of the Revolutionary Command Council (the real power in the land). His cousin and fellow

Tikriti, General Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr, had become President of the Council. In 1968 and 1969 major purges took place, including a public orgy of executions in Baghdad's "Liberation Square," where fourteen "spies" were publicly hanged.

On National Day, July 17, 1979, Saddam Hussein finally declared himself President, as President al-Bakr had resigned the day before supposedly because of poor health. Five days later Saddam Hussein began his "night of the long knives," a dramatic purge at a meeting attended by nearly one thousand party members, his way of ridding himself of potential rivals. In this psychological game of terror, he would indicate names on a list and party members would read out confessions of their supposed participation in Syrian-backed plots against the nation and the party. The "survivors," at this meeting, probably stricken with terror, shouted "Long live Saddam" and "death for the traitors"(Darwish & Alexander, 1991; Karsh & Rautsi, 1991), the latter a clear indication of the what the "identification with the aggressor" syndrome and shared guilt is all about.

To make sure that everybody got the message, Saddam Hussein had the whole event filmed and distributed to top officials in the Ba'th party and the military. Afterward, twenty-two of the "conspirators" were sentenced to death through "democratic executions," meaning firing squads manned by their fellow party members including Saddam Hussein. Others got lengthy prison sentences. The fabrication of plots and the use of terror would become a major weapon in Saddam Hussein's arsenal to align the masses behind his leadership.

Iraq was run (and still is) by Saddam Hussein like a family business, with himself as the head "mafioso" having assigned all the "goodies" to his family members and close associates, mainly from the city of Tikrit (Rayski,1991; Baram,1991, p.10). All together they have been bleeding different sectors of the economy. In order to hide the fact that

almost all those in top positions share the family name al-Tikriti, one of Saddam's first decrees as President was to abolish family names. Henceforth, all new birth certificates would record only the child's first name and the father's name.

Saddam Hussein's public image of self-renunciation in the service of the nation is far removed from reality. The greed and ostentatious living of his family have become legendary. One article mentioned that his wife, Sagida, possesses jewelry valued at 325 million dollars. His uncle, Khayrallah, eventually had to be removed from office as mayor of Baghdad when his greed became too excessive even for Saddam. His eldest son, Oudai, is known not only for his "creative" business dealings but also for his violent temper, having killed quite a few people.

From the kind of information available we can make inferences as to what Saddam Hussein's inner world is like: a world of grandiosity and violence. A paranoid mode-- ascerbated by exposure to a political system characterized by coups and counter-coups-- predominates. This can be seen in his creation of a bloody form of totalitarianism whereby the population is totally controlled and terrorized by the Ba'th Party, which in turn is totally controlled by him. And, to consolidate the mind control under which the Iraqis live, the secret police invents a continuous stream of enemies and enforces its policies through torture. The world is split into those for Saddam and against him. In a world of plotters and spies, scapegoats have to be found continually. Informers are everywhere, ready to report any suspicious activity. The kind of regime he has created strongly resembles that of Stalin who is incidentally one of his heros.

Saddam Hussein's actions reflect the violence inside him. We can see it in his preoccupation with the elimination of political opponents, and with his hit squads, which are sent out all over the world. We can also see it in the gassing of his own citizens, the

Kurds and the treatment of the Shi'ites. But most of all we have seen it reflected in the innumerable dead in the two bloody wars he has initiated and lost.

Saddam Hussein has been searching for a new kind of Iraqi world order. He shrewdly recognizes the value of symbolism to enhance the quest for unity and national identity. At the same time, his statements strongly reflect his narcissistic way of thinking, his need for grandiosity and his lack of touch with reality. He presents himself as the infallible leader, the inheritor of the mantle of Nebuchadnezzar and Salaheddin, remembrances of a glorious past. For example, in 1989 he started the reconstruction of the famous palace of Babylon, in the ancient city of Mesopotamia. He also invited officials of many countries to the cornerstone-laying ceremonies for what was to be his new palace. The apotheosis of this celebration was the moment when the crossed images of Saddam Hussein and Nebuchadnezzar were projected in the sky by laser beams. Saddam has even presented the Iraqi public with a kind of family tree which traces his roots to the noblest lineage, the prophet Mohammed. In the press he has often been referred to by the name of one of the Abbassiyed Caliphs (in the 8th century A.D., the Muslim Abbassiyed state stretched from Morocco to Pakistan). As in Stalinist Russia, Iraqi history is continuously rewritten depending on the most recent alliances. What is truth and what is fiction have become indistinguishable (Al-Khalil,1981).

When interviewed at the peak of his power, Saddam Hussein would enter a "dream world" and dwell nostalgically on the fact that his whole region was once the shining light for other civilizations. According to him (and here his paranoid way of thinking comes through once more), the Arab nation, "the source of all prophets and the cradle of civilization" (Matar,1981, p.229), is endangered by foreign blocs and superpowers. Salvation will come, however, through the Iraqi revolutionary, who "must be a light that shines throughout the Arab nation" (Matar,1981, p.237).

From his conversations with Matar (1981), we can infer that Saddam Hussein has seen it as his personal God-given mission to unite the Arab nations against the threat of the infidels, the foreign usurpers (a rallying cry which certainly hits a responsive chord among the impoverished Arab masses). One enemy is singled out in particular, the Zionists. They make his role in life even clearer. Wasn't it Nebuchadnezzar who brought the bound Jewish slaves back from Palestine? Saddam Hussein would like to see the foreign aggressors being chased away and the Arab nation experiencing a renaissance.

The words narcissism and grandiosity take on an unreal aura when we look at the personality cult which was in existence before operation "Desert Storm" demonstrated that the hero really had clay feet. Saddam Hussein's campaign of forced adulation has had few equals in modern history. There were the endless billboards with Saddam Hussein's portrait and the political broadcasts during which his name would be mentioned at the rate of thirty to fifty times an hour, with congratulations for his latest achievements. His birthday was a national holiday. The airport in Baghdad is called Saddam International Airport. Wherever he went, the traffic would grind to a halt. Iraqi school children recited his sayings, dressed in T shirts with his portrait, and even wore wristwatches with his portrait. Up until he started the war with the Allies, Saddam Hussein was the personification of the "ideal" Iraqi character: we have only to think of the Iraqi men who accompanied him everywhere and compared their mannerisms, dress, and even their mustaches with his. It looked like he had surrounded himself with clones.

The violence of the Saddam Hussein regime created an environment where the identification-with-the-aggressor syndrome reached surreal proportions. His actions certainly facilitated this kind of behavior. Saying something he wouldn't like to hear easily turned into a capital offence, making sycophancy and self-abasement the only viable

alternatives. To clarify what he was after, he would say, "We must ensure that the thirteen and a half million [Iraqis] take the same road. He who chooses the twisted path will meet with the sword" (Kursh & Rautsi, 1991, p. 120).

Saddam certainly is a leader who arouses mixed emotions. Before operation "Desert Storm," people tried to overcome their fear by proclaiming their love for him, which was a very literal form of life insurance given the ever-present Jihaz Haneen. And, who knows, if you said it often enough you might even start to believe in your own words; you might internalize such beliefs and really view Saddam Hussein as the voice of the people.

Saddam Hussein ruled like the ancient governor of Iraq, with blood dripping from the turbans and the beards. He is known to have said that Western democracy is not suitable for the Arab nation. Instead, he preferred a process of what he would call "consultation" (Matar, 1981, p.271). Terror, however, may have been a more appropriate term.

In spite of all the noise made by the Iraqi propaganda machine, Saddam Hussein seems to be the proverbial actor in search of a character, a person desperately in need of external stimuli to shore up a very shaky sense of self-esteem and identity. Continuous admiration by his followers is a much sought after commodity. Anyone else daring to share the limelight will do it at his own peril as some of Saddam's close collaborators have discovered the hard way.

To facilitate this identification and "mirroring" process Saddam Hussein would present himself one day as an ancient pre-Biblical warrior, the next day as an Islamic conqueror, and subsequently as a modern nationalist or pan-Arabic hero.

Saddam Hussein has made his inner theater external reality. It seems to be his way of settling accounts with past feelings of helplessness and humiliation. He has consequently created a world ruled by violence and megalomania where nobody can really be trusted. Paranoid thinking occupies a central position. He strongly believes that he is destined to be stuck in a complex web of conspiracies, an assumption which may become a self-fulfilling prophecy. He has not hesitated to eliminate many of his closest collaborators. But this hasn't given him peace of mind. On the contrary, he seems to be all too familiar with the saying that those who live by the sword will die by the sword. The fear of assassination--particularly in light of his own murderous actions--is ever present.

Saddam Hussein lives in a world of bunkers, bodyguards, food tasters, and doubles (Brooks & Horwitz, 1991, p.1). The rare journalist who visits him is stripped naked for a body search, has his hands put in a blue chemical solution to expose or wash away toxins that may be transferred in a handshake, and surrenders his pen taken apart and checked for weapons.

The end game is impossible to predict. Saddam Hussein has lost the "mother of all battles" (a possible reminder of his ambivalent relationship with his own mother) and is now ruling a badly divided country. The economy is in ruins. His image has been shattered. He has to handle a very demoralized and restless population which feels betrayed in not having gotten the promised power and prosperity. Now the people curse him as muka' ab shaytan, a phrase meaning triple devil. As things look now, the only way he can go is down. But as we have seen, his resilience should not be underestimated. His political astuteness should be recognized for what it is. Unlike other dictators, he is not really a prisoner of a political ideology. His main concern is to hold on to power whatever the price may be.

Whatever can be said about Saddam 's lack of reality testing, one has to give him credit for his remarkable ability to hang on. The army has been purged and so has the regime. He again can be heard repeating his theories about Zionist and imperialist conspiracies (after all, isn't character destiny?). The media are again going full blast praising Saddam Hussein, congratulating him for his victorious actions against US-led aggression.

Given what we know about his background, his inclination for a self defeating kind of behavior, and his continuing brinkmanship (the hiding of his nuclear material being a very good example) it almost seems that Saddam is hoping for martyrdom. Only the future can tell if he will succeed in becoming a modern-day martyr and what form that martyrdom will take.

Could anyone have predicted that the boy from Tikrit would turn out the way he did? Could anyone have foreseen that the fit between "historical moment" (meaning a certain vulnerable time in a nation's development) and the vicissitudes of personality would lead to such disastrous results? Whatever the case may be, the folly of Saddam Hussein's actions has given him a kind of infamy--hundreds of thousands of people killed, not to mention his responsibility for economic and ecological disasters--which will stand the test of time. Perhaps Dominique Moisi, the Associate Director of the Institut Francais des Relations Internationales, puts it most unequivocally when he says that Saddam Hussein turned out to be "the wrong man at the wrong time, with the wrong message and the wrong strategy" (1991, p.8).

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90/55 EP	Michael BURDA and Stefan GERLACH	"Intertemporal Prices and the US Trade Balance", (Revised July 1990).	90/67 TM/SE/FIN	Soumitra DUTTA and Piero BONISSONE	"Integrating Prior Cases and Expert Knowledge In a Mergers and Acquisitions Reasoning System", September 1990
90/56 EP	Damien NEVEN and Lars-Hendrik RÖLLER	"The Structure and Determinants of East-West Trade: A Preliminary Analysis of the Manufacturing Sector", July 1990	90/68 TM/SE	Soumitra DUTTA	"A Framework and Methodology for Enhancing the Business Impact of Artificial Intelligence Applications", September 1990
90/57 FIN/EP/ TM	Lars Tyge NIELSEN	Common Knowledge of a Multivariate Aggregate Statistic", July 1990	90/69 TM	Soumitra DUTTA	"A Model for Temporal Reasoning in Medical Expert Systems", September 1990
90/58 FIN/EP/TM	Lars Tyge NIELSEN	"Common Knowledge of Price and Expected Cost in an Oligopolistic Market", August 1990	90/70 TM	Albert ANGEHRN	"Triple C': A Visual Interactive MCDSS", September 1990
90/59 FIN	Jean DERMINE and Lars-Hendrik RÖLLER	"Economies of Scale and Scope in the French Mutual Funds (SICAV) Industry", August 1990	90/71 MKT	Philip PARKER and Hubert GATIGNON	"Competitive Effects in Diffusion Models: An Empirical Analysis", September 1990
90/60 TM	Peri IZ and Tawfik JELASSI	"An Interactive Group Decision Aid for Multiobjective Problems: An Empirical Assessment", September 1990	90/72 TM	Enver YÜCESAN	"Analysis of Markov Chains Using Simulation Graph Models", October 1990
90/61 TM	Pankaj CHANDRA and Mihkel TOMBAK	"Models for the Evaluation of Manufacturing Flexibility", August 1990	90/73 TM	Arnoud DE MEYER and Kasra FERDOWS	"Removing the Barriers in Manufacturing", October 1990
90/62 EP	Damien NEVEN and Menno VAN DIJK	"Public Policy Towards TV Broadcasting in the Netherlands", August 1990	90/74 SM	Sumantra GHOSHAL and Nitin NOHRIA	"Requisite Complexity: Organising Headquarters- Subsidiary Relations in MNCs", October 1990

90/75 MKT	Roger BETANCOURT and David GAUTSCHI	"The Outputs of Retail Activities: Concepts, Measurement and Evidence", October 1990	90/87 FIN/EP	Lars Tyge NIELSEN	"Existence of Equilibrium in CAPM: Further Results", December 1990
90/76 MKT	Wilfried VANHONACKER	"Managerial Decision Behaviour and the Estimation of Dynamic Sales Response Models", Revised October 1990	90/88 OB/MKT	Susan C. SCHNEIDER and Reinhard ANGELMAR	"Cognition in Organisational Analysis: Who's Minding the Store?" Revised, December 1990
90/77 MKT	Wilfried VANHONACKER	"Testing the Koyck Scheme of Sales Response to Advertising: An Aggregation-Independent Autocorrelation Test", October 1990	90/89 OB	Manfred F.R. KETS DE VRIES	"The CEO Who Couldn't Talk Straight and Other Tales from the Board Room," December 1990
90/78 EP	Michael BURDA and Stefan GERLACH	"Exchange Rate Dynamics and Currency Unification: The Ostmark - DM Rate", October 1990	90/90 MKT	Philip PARKER	"Price Elasticity Dynamics over the Adoption Lifecycle: An Empirical Study," December 1990
90/79 TM	Anil GABA	"Inferences with an Unknown Noise Level in a Bernoulli Process", October 1990			
90/80 TM	Anil GABA and Robert WINKLER	"Using Survey Data in Inferences about Purchase Behaviour", October 1990	<u>1991</u>		
90/81 TM	Tawfik JELASSI	"Du Présent au Futur: Bilan et Orientations des Systèmes Interactifs d'Aide à la Décision," October 1990	91/01 TM/SM	Luk VAN WASSENHOVE, Leonard FORTUIN and Paul VAN BEEK	"Operational Research Can Do More for Managers Than They Think!," January 1991
90/82 EP	Charles WYPLOSZ	"Monetary Union and Fiscal Policy Discipline," November 1990	91/02 TM/SM	Luk VAN WASSENHOVE, Leonard FORTUIN and Paul VAN BEEK	"Operational Research and Environment," January 1991
90/83 FIN/TM	Nathalie DIERKENS and Bernard SINCLAIR-DESGAGNE	"Information Asymmetry and Corporate Communication: Results of a Pilot Study", November 1990	91/03 FIN	Pekka HIETALA and Timo LÖYTTYNIEMI	"An Implicit Dividend Increase in Rights Issues: Theory and Evidence," January 1991
90/84 MKT	Philip M. PARKER	"The Effect of Advertising on Price and Quality: The Optometric Industry Revisited," December 1990	91/04 FIN	Lars Tyge NIELSEN	"Two-Fund Separation, Factor Structure and Robustness," January 1991
90/85 MKT	Avijit GHOSH and Vikas TIBREWALA	"Optimal Timing and Location in Competitive Markets," November 1990	91/05 OB	Susan SCHNEIDER	"Managing Boundaries in Organisations," January 1991
90/86 EP/TM	Olivier CADOT and Bernard SINCLAIR-DESGAGNE	"Prudence and Success in Politics," November 1990	91/06 OB	Manfred KETS DE VRIES, Danny MILLER and Alain NOEL	"Understanding the Leader-Strategy Interface: Application of the Strategic Relationship Interview Method," January 1990 (89/11, revised April 1990)

91/07 EP	Olivier CADOT	"Lending to Insolvent Countries: A Paradoxical Story," January 1991	91/19 MKT	Vikas TIBREWALA and Bruce BUCHANAN	"An Aggregate Test of Purchase Regularity", March 1991
91/08 EP	Charles WYPLOSZ	"Post-Reform East and West: Capital Accumulation and the Labour Mobility Constraint," January 1991	91/20 MKT	Darius SABAVALA and Vikas TIBREWALA	"Monitoring Short-Run Changes in Purchasing Behaviour", March 1991
91/09 TM	Spyros MAKRIDAKIS	"What can we Learn from Failure?", February 1991	91/21 SM	Sumantra GHOSHAL, Harry KORINE and Gabriel SZULANSKI	"Interunit Communication within MNCs: The Influence of Formal Structure Versus Integrative Processes", April 1991
91/10 TM	Luc Van WASSENHOVE and C. N. POTTS	"Integrating Scheduling with Batching and Lot-Sizing: A Review of Algorithms and Complexity", February 1991	91/22 EP	David GOOD, Lars-Hendrik RÖLLER and Robin SICKLES	"EC Integration and the Structure of the Franco-American Airline Industries: Implications for Efficiency and Welfare", April 1991
91/11 TM	Luc VAN WASSENHOVE et al.	"Multi-Item Lotsizing in Capacitated Multi-Stage Serial Systems", February 1991	91/23 TM	Spyros MAKRIDAKIS and Michèle HIBON	"Exponential Smoothing: The Effect of Initial Values and Loss Functions on Post-Sample Forecasting Accuracy", April 1991 (Revision of 90/46)
91/12 TM	Albert ANGEHRN	"Interpretative Computer Intelligence: A Link between Users, Models and Methods in DSS", February 1991	91/24 TM	Louis LE BLANC and Tawfik JELASSI	"An Empirical Assessment of Choice Models for Software Evaluation and Selection", May 1991
91/13 EP	Michael BURDA	"Labor and Product Markets in Czechoslovakia and the Ex-GDR: A Twin Study", February 1991	91/25 SM/TM	Luk N. VAN WASSENHOVE and Charles J. CORBETT	"Trade-Offs? What Trade-Offs?" April 1991
91/14 MKT	Roger BETANCOURT and David GAUTSCHI	"The Output of Retail Activities: French Evidence", February 1991	91/26 TM	Luk N. VAN WASSENHOVE and C.N. POTTS	"Single Machine Scheduling to Minimize Total Late Work", April 1991
91/15 OB	Manfred F.R. KETS DE VRIES	"Exploding the Myth about Rational Organisations and Executives", March 1991	91/27 FIN	Nathalie DIERKENS	"A Discussion of Correct Measures of Information Asymmetry: The Example of Myers and Majluf's Model or the Importance of the Asset Structure of the Firm", May 1991
91/16 TM	Arnoud DE MEYER and Kasra FERDOWS et.al.	"Factories of the Future: Executive Summary of the 1990 International Manufacturing Futures Survey", March 1991	91/28 MKT	Philip M. PARKER	"A Note on: 'Advertising and the Price and Quality of Optometric Services', June 1991
91/17 TM	Dirk CATTRYSE, Roelof KUIK, Marc SALOMON and Luk VAN WASSENHOVE	"Heuristics for the Discrete Lotsizing and Scheduling Problem with Setup Times", March 1991	91/29 TM	Tawfik JELASSI and Abbas FOROUGH	"An Empirical Study of an Interactive, Session-Oriented Computerised Negotiation Support System (NSS)", June 1991
91/18 TM	C.N. POTTS and Luk VAN WASSENHOVE	"Approximation Algorithms for Scheduling a Single Machine to Minimize Total Late Work", March 1991			

91/30 MKT	Wilfried R. VANHONACKER and Lydia J. PRICE	"Using Meta-Analysis Results in Bayesian Updating: The Empty Cell Problem", June 1991	91/43 SM	Sumantra GHOSHAL and Christopher BARTLETT	"Building Transnational Capabilities: The Management Challenge", September 1991
91/31 FIN	Rezaul KABIR and Theo VERMAELEN	"Insider Trading Restrictions and the Stock Market", June 1991	91/44 SM	Sumantra GHOSHAL and Nitin NOHRIA	"Distributed Innovation in the 'Differentiated Network' Multinational", September 1991
91/32 OB	Susan C. SCHNEIDER	"Organisational Sensemaking: 1992", June 1991	91/45 MKT	Philip M. PARKER	"The Effect of Advertising on Price and Quality: An Empirical Study of Eye Examinations, Sweet Lemons and Self-Deceivers", September 1991
91/33 EP	Michael C. BURDA and Michael FUNKE	"German Trade Unions after Unification - Third Degree Wage Discriminating Monopolists?", June 1991	91/46 MKT	Philip M. PARKER	"Pricing Strategies in Markets with Dynamic Elasticities", October 1991
91/34 FIN	Jean DERMINE	"The BIS Proposal for the Measurement of Interest Rate Risk, Some Pitfalls", June 1991	91/47 MKT	Philip M. PARKER	"A Study of Price Elasticity Dynamics Using Parsimonious Replacement/Multiple Purchase Diffusion Models", October 1991
91/35 FIN	Jean DERMINE	"The Regulation of Financial Services in the EC. Centralization or National Autonomy?" June 1991	91/48 EP/TM	H. Landis GABEL and Bernard SINCLAIR-DESGAGNE	"Managerial Incentives and Environmental Compliance", October 1991
91/36 TM	Albert ANGEHRN	"Supporting Multicriteria Decision Making: New Perspectives and New Systems", August 1991	91/49 TM	Bernard SINCLAIR-DESGAGNE	"The First-Order Approach to Multi-Task Principal-Agent Problems", October 1991
91/37 EP	Ingo WALTER and Hugh THOMAS	"The Introduction of Universal Banking in Canada: An Event Study", August 1991	91/50 SM/TM	Luk VAN WASSENHOVE and Charles CORBETT	"How Green is Your Manufacturing Strategy?" October 1991
91/38 EP	Ingo WALTER and Anthony SAUNDERS	"National and Global Competitiveness of New York City as a Financial Center", August 1991	91/51 MKT	Philip M. PARKER	"Choosing Among Diffusion Models: Some Empirical Guidelines", October 1991
91/39 EP	Ingo WALTER and Anthony SAUNDERS	"Reconfiguration of Banking and Capital Markets in Eastern Europe", August 1991	91/52 EP	Michael BURDA and Charles WYPLOSZ	"Human Capital, Investment and Migration in an Integrated Europe", October 1991
91/40 TM	Luk VAN WASSENHOVE, Dirk CATTRYSSE and Marc SALOMON	"A Set Partitioning Heuristic for the Generalized Assignment Problem", August 1991	91/53 EP	Michael BURDA and Charles WYPLOSZ	"Labour Mobility and German Integration: Some Vignettes", October 1991
91/41 TM	Luk VAN WASSENHOVE, M.Y. KOVALYOU and C.N. POTTS	"A Fully Polynomial Approximation Scheme for Scheduling a Single Machine to Minimize Total Weighted Late Work", August 1991	91/54 TM	Albert ANGEHRN	"Stimulus Agents: An Alternative Framework for Computer-Aided Decision Making", October 1991
91/42 TM	Rob R. WEITZ and Tawfik JELASSI	"Solving A Multi-Criteria Allocation Problem: A Decision Support System Approach", August 1991			

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EP/SM | Robin HOGARTH,
Claude MICHAUD,
Yves DOZ, and
Ludo VAN DER HEYDEN | "Longevity of Business Firms: A Four-Stage Framework for Analysis" , November 1991 |
| 91/56
TM/EP | Bernard SINCLAIR DESGAGNE | "Aspirations and Economic Development" ,
November 1991 |
| 91/57
MKT | Lydia J. PRICE | "The Indirect Effects of Negative Information on Attitude Change" , November 1991 |