"MAKING ACQUISITIONS WORK"

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Financial engineering is dead and not a day too soon. While the public's attention has been turned to raiders, hostile takeovers, and financial acquisitions, the great preponderance of acquisitions in the United States, the United Kingdom, and almost all the activity in Continental Europe and Japan continues to be strategic in nature, generally amicable, and among firms and management groups who neither seek publicity nor encourage it.[1] In the nineties the strategic acquisition phenomenon appears increasingly broad based and global in scope.

The promise of strategic acquisitions continues as new industries enter their own restructuring maelstrom, as many firms augment their competitive positions with new capabilities, and as new competitors begin acquisition programs. Witness, for example the rapid change in attitude of Japanese companies vis a vis acquisitions. For every company that restructures and refocuses on what it considers its primary businesses, a buyer must be found to take the unwanted activities. However, any such restructuring and paring will be worthwhile only if the divesters have considered how they will renew their competitive positions which may again involve acquisitions.

Behind this acquisition activity lies a history of experiences and research on acquisitions that should caution managers. Study upon study from financial economists repeats the same warning: although acquisitions may create value by reallocating resources to more productive uses, buying company shareholders do not, on the average, seem to benefit.[2] Beyond paying too much for benefits in the future, many of the synergies so clearly projected on paper remain unrealized. A less visible, but equally pervasive problem is that irrespective of the value created through some synergies, the integration process can also destroy value and threaten the existence of the very capabilities that were the basis of the acquisition. Finally, many acquisitions do not reach their potential because of the failure to create an atmosphere in which a fruitful exchange of capabilities and learning can take place. While successful acquirers would point out that many of

the benefits they ended up achieving were unknown at the time of the acquisition, many companies are not capable of getting beyond the original script.

How to make acquisitions work is a crucial issue and one that has been relatively ignored by academic researchers and the media alike. Why is it that some companies seem to handle acquisition decisions well and others not? Why is it that some firms are able to provide direction to integration efforts where others fail? This article draws on our nine collective years of research in acquisitive firms from 11 countries and identifies key challenges in managing acquisitions and the practices by which management teams can help acquisitions contribute to corporate renewal. (The boxed insert provides a brief description of our studies.)

The primary message from our research is that success with acquisitions depends foremost on a company's ability to handle the decision making and even more so the integration process. Strategic fit considerations may determine the potential value of an acquisition and organizational fit considerations may determine the difficulty of realizing those benefits. The actual value created however flows directly from the company's capacity to manage the acquisition process. We suggest that this capacity is something that can be developed and improved by a two-pronged approach: One involves creating an acquisition *context* in which the firm's corporate development strategy can be realized. The second is adopting a *mindset* that acknowledges and reinforces the contributions that acquisitions can make to that strategy by bringing in new capabilities and encouraging learning. Together this context and mindset allow the firm to address the challenges inherent in an acquisitive strategy.

CHALLENGES OF AN ACQUISITIVE STRATEGY

Acquisitions have a unique potential to transform firms and to contribute to corporate growth and renewal. They can be instrumental in renewing market positions at a speed not possible through internal development. Through acquisitions existing capabilities can be leveraged into much more significant positions. Acquisitions can provide the ability to access the benefits from combining assets and sharing capabilities in a way not obtainable through partnerships or alliances.

More profoundly however, acquisitions can also bring into a firm new capabilities and ways of thinking that challenge the existing order and offer new opportunities for growth and renewal.

Our research suggests that executives that choose to use acquisitions as a key component of their firm's strategic growth and renewal face four common challenges:

- Ensuring that acquisitions support our firm's overall corporate development strategy
- Developing a preacquisition decision making process where the "right" acquisition opportunities are considered and that will result in (for any particular acquisition candidate) a meaningful justification given limited information and the need for speed and secrecy.
- Managing the post-acquisition integration process to create the value hoped for when the acquisition was conceived.
- Fostering both acquisition-specific and broader organizational learning as a result of the acquisition

Fit with strategy

Ensuring that acquisition decisions are consistent with strategy is difficult, no matter how clear top management is about its current strategy or how disciplined a strategic planning process a company has. Individual acquisition opportunities often call a firm's strategy into question as much as they fit with it. The reciprocal and sometimes uncertain relationship relationship between strategy and acquisitions is is illustrated by the way in which BASF's strategic and geographic focus was affected by three different U.S. acquisition opportunities in 1985 totalling $1.3 billion. One, the purchase of American Enka's fiber business from AKZO, was an extention of the company's well-defined strategy of vertical integration. It provided a captive use for BASF's American caprolactan feedstock facilities. The second acquisition, a bid for Inmont, the US paint manufacturer, would bring BASF's Paints Division into the top three in the world market for automotive paint. Yet, this acquisition however did not fall within the Paints Division's existing strategy which had received approval for a more modest, largely European focus. The fact that Inmont was for sale led the board of BASF to encourage its division not only to analyze Inmont but also to revise the divisional ambition and strategy. The third acquisition, a bid for the

Celanese advanced materials businesses, did not fit into any clearly defined strategy. Apart from considerable R&D competencies, advanced materials was a field where BASF did not yet have significant resources, and one where any strategic plan would be seen as fictitious given the uncertainties involved. Ultimately this decision was based on the mangers' confidence in their vision for the field of advanced composites and on their willingness to build up the capabilities to become a significant player.

Most of the managers we interviewed were searching for an appropriate balance between opportunism in acquisitions and the degree to which acquisition strategies could be pinned down specifically enough for financial valuation. They were often at pains to reconcile their confidence in the strategic logic of an acquisition and its demonstrable discounted cash flow. The need to manage this relationship among the uncertainties associated with a firm's acquisition opportunities, its strategy, and the need for results is a key challenge in an acquisitive strategy.

Quality of Acquisition Decision Making

Many of the managers we studied did not pause to consider how their acquisition decision making process affected either their decision or ultimately the acquisition outcome itself.[3] Acquisitions were often made because a manager or a small group of managers were able to develop a justification for an acquisition opportunity which a sufficient number of influential people were willing to endorse. We saw a great variety in the quality of these acquisition justifications. In some situations the power of the strategic logic stood out clearly. In other situations, the strategic brief sounded promising on the surface but it lacked depth on key specifics including sources of benefits and a consideration of the risks and costs. Frequently it was clear that, although many players in a firm agreed to buy, they all had very different motives for the acquisition. The organizational requirements needed to realize the hoped for synergies were often barely touched, let alone the path in time that would lead there. In sum, most of the discussion revolved around the price issue.

Why, with good advice and managers who want to succeed are acquisition justifications often shallow and fictitious? Four problems stand out. First, decision making is often fragmented among many groups, each covering its own perspective with none taking a generalist's viewpoint and a central focus on the business decision. A second is the difficulty tempering the momentum that sets in towards making a deal. The forces that favor the deal are often stronger than the extra hurdles put in place. A third is the fact that difference in motivations is no restraint on the acquisition decision. To the contrary, as long as each key player can read his own preferences into the acquisition justification he or she is likely to be supportive. Finally some acquisitions start on a shallow footing because negotiators are loath to clarify differences of opinion, no matter how important, agreeing to disagree on key points when there is an overwhelming urge to complete negotiations.[4]

The challenge for managers is to set up a decision making process with several characteristics: the business decision must be the central focus, supported by but not a prisoner to the due diligence process that must take place. The momentum of the process must be regulated -- slowed down or speeded up as the case indicates. Motives among key actors need to be clarified with time priorities for involvement and implementation set. Finally, ambiguities that could threaten central aspects of the acquisition's purpose must be clarified.

Focus on Integration

Almost any acquisition can be made to look good on paper. Yet no matter how attractive the opportunity appears, value creation only happens after the acquisition when capabilities are transferred and people from both organizations collaborate to realize the potential benefits or to discover others. This collaboration relies on the will and ability of managers in both organizations to work together toward the new strategic task. All too often firms forego the benefits of an acquisition by either dictating adherence to a predetermined path or by avoiding changes in the acquired company to minimize resistance and disruption. The key to integration is to enlist the participation of the necessary people without compromising the strategic task.

Synergies ultimately result from interactions between the people in both organizations. This means that it is critical from day one to have people who can manage these interactions and are empowered to do so. Those executives responsible for an acquisition must demonstrate how it can improve the firm's competitive position and create value, e.g., sharing resources between the firms, transferring skills among the business functions, improving the general management of the company, or providing the firm with more muscle in its markets or with suppliers. Synergies often occur at the middle management and operating levels, where the work actually gets done after the two groups have come together. These opportunities are often difficult to predict beforehand, especially if those who will have to run the acquisition are not those who analyze and negotiate it. The comments of a bank's senior planning officer point to this problem:

> As soon as the acquisition looked like a "go," we quickly prepared a set of synergy arguments for the board that made sense *prima facie*. It turned out that none of these ever amounted to anything. The only ones that seemed to work were those that came from the operating guys.

To effectively bring about the transfer of capabilities and create those synergies, an atmosphere conducive to such transfer must be created and an overall context needs to be set in place. Many companies we saw focused too directly and immediately on the synergies. They neglected creating the conditions that would allow both groups of managers to develop together a reciprocal understanding of the other firm, a common task they would jointly pursue, and a motivation that would allow people to take part in discovering and realizing the synergy potential. The experiences of a marketing manager in a finance company recently acquired by a bank reflect this progression of learning:

> Immediately after the acquisition we didn't know what to think. They were bigger and had more procedures than we did. So we resisted any offers to help. After a while we learned that their procedures actually improved efficiency, and we listened more. We were then able to see how we could apply their very systematic approach to product development in our situation.

Although it is tempting to develop a standard integration approach to deal with all acquisitions, important differences exist and tradeoffs must be made. Our research has led to a pragmatic framework for acquisition integration that focuses on two components. The first

considers the strategic purpose around which the acquisition was justified and the integration needs this purpose implies. At the same time, managers must acknowledge that the integration process can destroy the capabilities that were the original reason for the acquisition. Thus managers must be conscious of the organizational requirements for autonomy whenever maintaining a difference in culture is central to achieving the acquisition's purpose.

Capacity for learning

The acquisitions we examined provided executives and their firms with unique (albeit sometimes expensive) opportunities to learn as they were put in situations outside their regular strategic, organizational, and cultural contexts. Two types of learning occurred. One type was acquisition-specific and related to both how to handle acquisitions and which acquisitions not to make. Some firms made an explicit effort to systematically identify what they had learned from each acquisition. In others, each business manager began with a clean slate and was left to individually develop experience or hasty generalizations drawn from limited exposure to or rumors about what had actually happened in prior acquisitions. Costly acquisition failures became even more costly when they were written off without the benefit of learning.

Acquisition successes that were achieved on the basis of near complete autonomy frequently led to disastrous subsequent acquisitions as no learning had been achieved. For example, in the 1970's British Petroleum acquired a small, private UK detergent's company which remained quite successful under the continued management of the prior owners. Based on this track record, BP subsequently made a much larger acquisition of a Belgian producer of detergents. Performance problems soon made evident how limited BP's understanding of the industry had been at the time of the acquisition. In contrast, BP's first acquisition in another unrelated area, nutrition, was not as successful, as their initial foray into detergents. As a result, a BP manager was put in to turn around the company in question. Based on this experience and the industry understanding derived from it, the subsequent acquisition of a much larger feed business was highly successful. After a

decade of nurturing, learning, and making other acquisitions to build the business, Nutrition was announced in 1990 as one of the four legs of BP's corporate strategy.

At a broader level, acquisitions offer companies the opportunity to develop new insights into their own strategic direction and to learn how to adapt their own organizational approach. We were struck by the extent to which acquisitions could be at the origin of major strategic and organizational adaptation in the acquiring organization. Some firms were hardly altered by the acquisitions they made; in others, acquisitions led to major changes in the rest of the firm. For example, the acquisition of the Beatrice Chemical companies in 1986 by ICI had several results. It led to the restructuring of both ICI's own advanced materials and its specialty chemicals businesses. More importantly, it also led to the institutionalization of an ICI-specific approach to handling acquisition teams and interface management. It also provided a symbolic example of the 'new' ICI that the then Chairman John Harvey-Jones was trying to shape.

BUILDING ACQUISITION CAPABILITY

The problems firms experience in meeting these acquisition challenges are not primarily due to the failings of individuals or to a lack of analytical insight into what should be done. Instead our research suggests that their roots are to be found in the organizational process by which managers tackle those issues. Typically the process by which firms make acquisition decisions and the organizational used in integration were not developed for making decisions about acquisitions in the first place. They were created to deal with much simpler and more malleable internal investment decisions. Acquisitions are a severe test of a firm's organizational capabilities and many firms do not achieve a passing grade.

A common orientation characterizes the firms we studied that were able to successfully manage an acquisitive strategy. This orientation addresses the four challenges we identified above and provides a foundation to deal with unforeseen occurrences. It includes:

- a *context* for acquisition decision making that allows the firm's strategic agenda to drive the decision making process and

- an *mindset* that grounds corporate success in the firm's capabilities and how they are applied

Context For Acquisition Decision Making

Making acquisition decisions is never easy -- there are always uncertainties. To manage acquisitive strategies firms need to develop a context for acquisition decision making that will result in a meaningful acquisition justification despite the uncertainties, pressures, and limitations inherent in the acquisition process. Such a context has to both insure that the firms strategic agenda drives the generation of acquisition opportunities and the evaluation process. Yet at the same time it has to be flexible to adapt to the opportunistic nature of how companies become for sale and to the inevitable adjustments in strategy that are called for because companies do not come exactly in the shape one wants. In this context the firm's strategic agenda drives the decision making process and adjustments in the process are made for the unique nature of acquisitions.

A sound acquisition decision process is grounded in a business unit's strategy. It begins with and depends a great deal on the degree to which the business planning process shapes a common understanding of not only how acquisitions can contribute to the business strategy but also the nature and size of the acquisitions each division is encouraged to pursue. In too many firms business planning and acquisition thinking are divorced from each other. Beyond individual businesses, the corporate acquisition function in larger firms serves the important role of stimulating proactive thinking among the businesses, clearing acquisition leads, and providing an established, legitimate source of questioning everything. Because it is operating-oriented, it can bring support and professionalism to the acquisition process which ultimately should remain firmly an operating responsibility. Because of its permanent and broad exposure, it becomes a repository for acquisition learning.

The context is also supported by an acquisition team for each acquisition. Members in such a team must see their role as contributing to the tradeoffs involved in a business judgment, rather than guarding the interests of their particular functions. Such a team will know the business well

enough to ask the critical questions. Moreover, at least some of the team know they will be involved in the postmerger phase so that risks are more likely to be surfaced and organizational realities and other soft but important issues of implementation are more likely to be addressed.

Perhaps the most important factor shaping the context is the way in which the interface between the two firms is managed. Paramount here is the choice of the people who work with the acquired company to bring about the benefits. How they are selected, how they are supported, and how they conceive of their role and exercise are essential for the acquisition success because value is only created when capabilities can be transferred between the firms.

Mindset

Beyond the organizational routines which provide the context to deal with acquisition decisions adequately, a firm's ability to manage an acquisitive strategy foremost depends on a managerial mindset (beginning at the top) that involves understanding how capabilities contribute to success, the importance of leadership in creating a new vision, and encouraging learning throughout the firm.

Adopting a capabilities-based perspective on corporate success is the most basic aspect of the corporate mindset required to support an acquisitive strategy. In this perspective a firm's competitive advantage is seen as coming from the application of its capabilities.[5] The usefulness of existing capabilities continually atrophies because of competition, technological change, changing customer needs, etc. Thus, management must continually identify those capabilities that are required to build competitive advantage for the future and judge the potential of prospective acquisitions on the basis of their ability to contribute new capabilities to improve the firm's competitive position. Beyond identifying capabilities, effective acquisitive managers in the firms we studied learned where and how important capabilities were embedded in acquired firms and protected these capabilities when necessary to insure that the reason for the acquisition was not destroyed in the integration process.

Accompanying this capabilities-based perspective is an acknowledgement of the importance and impact of the acquisition process itself on success. Management must develop a decision making process to support the strategy and carefully manage the interactions between the two firms during integration to balance planned changes with quick adaptation to opportunities that arise.

Developing a Vision. The willingness to exert leadership to develop a new vision for the combined firms is another aspect of this orientation. In many of the acquisitions we studied top management's attention tended to peak at the time of the agreement. They then moved on to other pressing matters leaving integration to lower-level operating managers. The experience of an executive from a financial services firm merger reflects the problems created by this senior management detachment and delegation:

> The chairman and president brought the top 10 people from both firms together and told us that we had a lot of potential if we could merge product lines and use each other's systems. They then told us that although there would be some start-up costs, they were confident that synergies would more than outweigh these and that we shouldn't have a performance dip. They then left the room and the two sides sat staring at each other wondering why we were there and how we were going to make it work.

Leadership from the top to develop a broad vision for the combined firms that accommodates the acquisition's purpose as well as the respective needs of the two, previously independent firms, is crucial. Without this, managers and employees in the combined firms retreat to their former, more familiar behaviors. This retreat creates organizational disruptions among the people who must act together to make the acquisition work. With such a vision, people from both firms can begin to understand and embrace the acquisition's purpose and see their role in it. Without it there is no comprehensive way to achieve buy-in among the acquired firm's managers who are inevitably uncertain and often depressed about their future prospects. Nor is there a mechanism to reinforce for one's own managers how they too will have to change.

A well articulated vision not only serves to remobilize and change the behavior of the managers involved, it also is a key ingredient in achieving the required flexibility and realism in the integration approach. No matter how careful the pre-acquisition analysis, reality is always

different. Time and again we encountered the seeming paradox that those acquisitions that were underpinned by the strongest visions were able to better adapt to the unforeseen. Agreement on an overriding priority made it easier to revise initial expectations and to agree on a new course to preserve the strategic objective while preserving reality. In contrast in more opportunistic acquisitions without a broader vision, managers held on strongly to the original script which was usually a numerical piece of fiction. Without a clearly shared vision of what the acquisition is about, it is much harder to depart from the details of promised synergies in order to deal with reality instead of retreating to the estimates and fiction embedded in the original justification.

Encouraging learning Firms with an acquisitive strategy encourage several types of learning. This includes learning which acquisitions to make (or not make), learning how to make them, learning about the acquired business, and incorporating learning into the acquiring firm's own organization.

A candid, detached evaluation of acquisition experiences is often difficult in firms. Few decisions equal acquisitions in their likelihood to become the labels attached to a manager's career. As a result, the retroactive interpretation of acquisition events may serve the political ends of protecting some managers' careers or of attaching a stigma to others. Nevertheless the legacy of an acquisition matters, as it becomes the basis for justifying or influencing future acquisition decisions.

Companies differ in their ability to interpret meaningfully and learn from their acquisition experiences. Moreover, based on similar experiences, they may draw very different conclusions from their failures. In some firms we studied, introspection following an acquisition led to a commitment to augment the organization's capability to improve both the decision making and integration processes and do better next time. In other companies each bad experience seemed to reduce the willingness to undertake in the future the type of acquisition in question. While reducing the chances of similar acquisition failures in the future, this attitude of course also implies that important strategic options are foregone.

The role of acquisitions in business learning is not limited to improving the decision making process or exploring new domains. A real test is how much can be learned from the acquired firm, even when they are in the same business or close to it. Mediocre acquirers we studied acknowledged all the outstanding features of an acquisition candidate to support the justification but ignored them during integration. Successful acquirers fostered a two-way learning process that involved adopting the best practices from both firms.

The most enduring payoffs from acquisitions we observed were in the learning that accrued in the acquiring firm as its own organizational capabilities and strategic position were transformed. This transition depended on the extent to which managers were open to the acquired capabilities and were able to leverage them in their own organizations. A good example of this was the acquisition by Electrolux of the lossmaking Italian white goods manufacturer Zanussi. Electrolux did not let the apparent weakness of Zanussi, nor its own urge to realize some hard rationalization benefits come in the way of using this acquisition to review and restructure its whole European strategy and organization. The new Electrolux relies prominently on the component capability acquired with Zanussi, on the Italian company's expertise and position in "wet products" such as dishwashers and washing machines, and on the product development and design capability which Zanussi could bring to the more manufacturing-oriented Swedish producer. As the white goods industry moves beyond its acquisitive restructuring, component capability and product innovation may well be the key success factors to withstand the onslaught of international competition.

In experienced acquirers like Electrolux, integration does not necessarily mean "making them like us." Instead acquiring firms keep in mind the underlying complementarity in capabilities and are able to give these capabilities a prominent role after the integration. Ultimately the companies that derived the most learning from acquisitions were those in which organizational change had become an accepted part of the organizational culture.

SUMMARY

The experienced firms that we studied did not develop their ability to manage an acquisitive strategy overnight. Instead it was the result of hard-won learning based on often dismal early acquisition track records with quite a few resulting skeletons in the closet. Many of these companies had gone through a period of major diversification at the corporate level, followed by another period of pruning, if not dramatic refocusing. The fact that many of their early acquisitions had subsequently been divested did not imply that fewer new acquisitions were made. To the contrary, the same firms were often most active in both acquisitions and divestments as the continuing work of repositioning and renewal implies both activities.[6]

The perspective we encourage puts strategic, financial, and organizational considerations of acquisitions into the context of the decision making and integration processes through which they are developed and by which their success or failure is determined. We believe that both caution and encouragement are called for. Caution is required, because making successful acquisitions is much more complex than managers assume before they begin. Behind the financial aspects of the deal lurk complex strategic questions and even more challenging organizational tasks. Encouragement is warranted because the payoffs may be high for management teams that can learn from their own experiences and from the experience of others about how to better manage the acquisition process.

The decisions top management makes about the role of acquisitions must come from juxtaposing competitive pressures and opportunities on the one hand and the organizational repertoire which shapes these options on the other hand. In a world where corporate-level and business-level competitiveness is derived from building and renewing a set of capabilities that will yield a competitive advantage, building fundamental corporate capabilities to manage an acquisitive strategy is an important responsibility of senior management.

Acquisitions are a revealing litmus test that highlight the quality of leadership and decision making in a company. We hope that the perspective offered here will be a catalyst for managers to consider their firms' corporate renewal needs and how acquisitions can be successfully managed to contribute to that renewal.

The Research Base

The insights in this article are derived from the merger of multi-year, in-depth field studies by both authors involving over 300 interviews in 20 firms. In total the authors studied acquisitions in eleven countries: Belgium, Finland, France, Italy, Germany, Great Britain, Japan, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Sweden, and the United States.

Jemison conducted two distinct studies on acquisitions. In a first study carried out in 1983-1984, a broad range of experienced acquirers were interviewed to develop an understanding of the acquisition decision process and the problems involved. (See D. Jemison and S. Sitkin, "Acquisitions: the Process Can be a Problem," Harvard Business Review, March-April 1986). In a subsequent study (1984-1986) the integration process was explored in-depth in a field study of seven related-business acquisitions. This study led to a capabilities-based perspective of acquisition integration and a diagnosis of the common integration problems that limited the creation of an atmosphere conducive to capability transfer and value creation.

Haspeslagh's research was conducted between 1985 and 1989 in three phases. First a detailed investigation was made of a structured sample of acquisitions in three companies in the broadly defined chemical sector: ICI, British Petroleum, and "Unichem", an American firm. A matched sample was identified of highly successful and unsuccessful acquisitions in each of three categories: acquisitions within a core business, acquisitions extending a core business, and unrelated ones. The resulting findings on how to manage acquisition decision making and how to manage in different integration settings were tested and refined in a similar investigation of acquisitions by a fourth company, the German BASF. In a third phase the analysis was extended to acquisitions in other industries, with particular emphasis on the successes and failures of 'strategic assemblers' such as the Swedish Electrolux in white goods, the Finnish Valmet in paper machinery, or the British Saatchi and Saatchi in advertising.

Their research is summarized in their recent book, Managing Acquisitions: Creating Value Through Corporate Renewal, (New York: Free Press, 1991).

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[1] Even in 1988, at the height of the 'financial deal' wave, such deals represented only 30.5% ($109.2 billion) of total acquisition activity in the US. At the same time strategic acquisitions were increasingly in the same or related businesses rather than unrelated ones. Source: Morgan Stanley.

[2]See Jensen "Takeovers Folklore & Science" and Haspeslagh & Jemison Appendix B for a summary of the research on acquisitions and perfomance.

[3] See "Acquisitions: the Process Can be a Problem" HBR May-June 1986 for a discussion of how problems in the acquisition decision making process can limit an acquisition's potential.

[4] ibid. See also Haspeslagh and and Jemison (1991) for a framework distinguishing the requirements of different integration approaches.

[5]Penrose's (1959) seminar work first raised the conception of the firm as a combination of capabilities embodied in an administrative framework. See Jemison (1988) for a discussion of how capabilities contribute to a competitive advantage and how acquisitions can add capabilities to a firm. See Prahalad and Hamel (1990) for an initial exposition of the concept of core competencies.

[6] Porter (1987) studied the acquisition and divestiture experience of 33 firms from 1950-1986. He concluded that firms' diversification strategies had failed, based on whether acquired units had been divested or shut down (failure) or kept in the firm (success). We do not advocate the blind acquisition and then divestment of firms. Using the presence or absence of divestment as a proxy for acquisition performance however fails to consider that acquisitive firms might be divesting because the nature of the strategic renewal in which they were involved necessitated both acquisition and divestment of capabilities and because of the learning and evolution of the corporate strategy that takes place after an acquisition.

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88/39	Manfred KETS DE VRIES	**"The Leader as Mirror : Clinical Reflections"**, July 1988.
88/40	Josef LAKONISHOK and Theo VERMAELEN	**"Anomalous price behavior around repurchase tender offers"**, August 1988.
88/41	Charles WYPLOSZ	**"Assymetry in the EMS: intentional or systemic?"**, August 1988.
88/42	Paul EVANS	**"Organizational development in the transnational enterprise"**, June 1988.
88/43	B. SINCLAIR-DESGAGNÉ	**"Group decision support systems implement Bayesian rationality"**, September 1988.
88/44	Essam MAHMOUD and Spyros MAKRIDAKIS	**"The state of the art and future directions in combining forecasts"**, September 1988.
88/45	Robert KORAJCZYK and Claude VIALLET	**"An empirical investigation of international asset pricing"**, November 1986, revised August 1988.
88/46	Yves DOZ and Amy SHUEN	**"From intent to outcome: a process framework for partnerships"**, August 1988.
88/47	Alain BULTEZ, Els GIJSBRECHTS,	**"Asymmetric cannibalism between substitute items listed by retailers"**, September 1988.

	Philippe NAERT and Piet VANDEN ABEELE	
88/48	Michael BURDA	**"Reflections on 'Wait unemployment' in Europe, II"**, April 1988 revised September 1988.
88/49	Nathalie DIERKENS	**"Information asymmetry and equity issues"**, September 1988.
88/50	Rob WEITZ and Arnoud DE MEYER	**"Managing expert systems: from inception through updating"**, October 1987.
88/51	Rob WEITZ	**"Technology, work, and the organization: the impact of expert systems"**, July 1988.
88/52	Susan SCHNEIDER and Reinhard ANGELMAR	**"Cognition and organizational analysis: who's minding the store?"**, September 1988.
88/53	Manfred KETS DE VRIES	**"Whatever happened to the philosopher-king: the leader's addiction to power**, September 1988.
88/54	Lars-Hendrik RÖLLER and Mihkel M. TOMBAK	**"Strategic choice of flexible production technologies and welfare implications"**, October 1988
88/55	Peter BOSSAERTS and Pierre HILLION	**"Method of moments tests of contingent claims asset pricing models"**, October 1988.
88/56	Pierre HILLION	**"Size-sorted portfolios and the violation of the random walk hypothesis: Additional empirical evidence and implication for tests of asset pricing models"**, June 1988.
88/57	Wilfried VANHONACKER and Lydia PRICE	**"Data transferability: estimating the response effect of future events based on historical analogy"**, October 1988.
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88/60	Michael BURDA	**"Is mismatch really the problem? Some estimates of the Chelwood Gate II model with US data"**, September 1988.
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88/62	Cynthia VAN HULLE, Theo VERMAELEN and Paul DE WOUTERS	**"Regulation, taxes and the market for corporate control in Belgium"**, September 1988.
88/63	Fernando NASCIMENTO and Wilfried R. VANHONACKER	**"Strategic pricing of differentiated consumer durables in a dynamic duopoly: a numerical analysis"**, October 1988.
88/64	Kasra FERDOWS	**"Charting strategic roles for international factories"**, December 1988.
88/65	Arnoud DE MEYER and Kasra FERDOWS	**"Quality up, technology down"**, October 1988
88/66	Nathalie DIERKENS	**"A discussion of exact measures of information assymetry: the example of Myers and Majluf model or the importance of the asset structure of the firm"**, December 1988.
88/67	Paul S. ADLER and Kasra FERDOWS	**"The chief technology officer"**, December 1988.

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89/01	Joyce K. BYRER and Tawfik JELASSI	**"The impact of language theories on DSS dialog"**, January 1989.
89/02	Louis A. LE BLANC and Tawfik JELASSI	**"DSS software selection: a multiple criteria decision methodology"**, January 1989.

89/03	Beth H. JONES and Tawfik JELASSI	**"Negotiation support: the effects of computer intervention and conflict level on bargaining outcome"**, January 1989.
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89/06	Mihkel M. TOMBAK and B. SINCLAIR-DESGAGNÉ	**"Coordinating manufacturing and business strategies: I"**, February 1989.
89/07	Damien J. NEVEN	**"Structural adjustment in European retail banking. Some view from industrial organisation"**, January 1989.
89/08	Arnoud DE MEYER and Hellmut SCHÜTTE	**"Trends in the development of technology and their effects on the production structure in the European Community"**, January 1989.
89/09	Damien NEVEN, Carmen MATUTES and Marcel CORSTJENS	**"Brand proliferation and entry deterrence"**, February 1989.
89/10	Nathalie DIERKENS, Bruno GERARD and Pierre HILLION	**"A market based approach to the valuation of the assets in place and the growth opportunities of the firm"**, December 1988.
89/11	Manfred KETS DE VRIES and Alain NOEL	**"Understanding the leader-strategy interface: application of the strategic relationship interview method"**, February 1989.
89/12	Wilfried VANHONACKER	**"Estimating dynamic response models when the data are subject to different temporal aggregation"**, January 1989.
89/13	Manfred KETS DE VRIES	**"The impostor syndrome: a disquieting phenomenon in organizational life"**, February 1989.
89/14	Reinhard ANGELMAR	**"Product innovation: a tool for competitive advantage"**, March 1989.
89/15	Reinhard ANGELMAR	**"Evaluating a firm's product innovation performance"**, March 1989.
89/16	Wilfried VANHONACKER, Donald LEHMANN and Fareena SULTAN	**"Combining related and sparse data in linear regression models"**, February 1989.
89/17	Gilles AMADO, Claude FAUCHEUX and André LAURENT	**"Changement organisationnel et réalités culturelles: contrastes franco-américains"**, March 1989.
89/18	Srinivasan BALAK-RISHNAN and Mitchell KOZA	**"Information asymmetry, market failure and joint-ventures: theory and evidence"**, March 1989.
89/19	Wilfried VANHONACKER, Donald LEHMANN and Fareena SULTAN	**"Combining related and sparse data in linear regression models"**, Revised March 1989.
89/20	Wilfried VANHONACKER and Russell WINER	**"A rational random behavior model of choice"**, Revised March 1989.
89/21	Arnoud de MEYER and Kasra FERDOWS	**"Influence of manufacturing improvement programmes on performance"**, April 1989.
89/22	Manfred KETS DE VRIES and Sydney PERZOW	**"What is the role of character in psychoanalysis?"** April 1989.
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89/24	Martin KILDUFF and Mitchel ABOLAFIA	**"The social destruction of reality: Organisational conflict as social drama"** zApril 1989.

89/25	Roger BETANCOURT and David GAUTSCHI	"Two essential characteristics of retail markets and their economic consequences" March 1989.
89/26	Charles BEAN, Edmond MALINVAUD, Peter BERNHOLZ, Francesco GIAVAZZI and Charles WYPLOSZ	"Macroeconomic policies for 1992: the transition and after", April 1989.
89/27	David KRACKHARDT and Martin KILDUFF	"Friendship patterns and cultural attributions: the control of organizational diversity", April 1989.
89/28	Martin KILDUFF	"The interpersonal structure of decision making: a social comparison approach to organizational choice", Revised April 1989.
89/29	Robert GOGEL and Jean-Claude LARRECHE	"The battlefield for 1992: product strength and geographic coverage", May 1989.
89/30	Lars-Hendrik ROLLER and Mihkel M. TOMBAK	"Competition and Investment in Flexible Technologies", May 1989.
89/31	Michael C. BURDA and Stefan GERLACH	"Intertemporal prices and the US trade balance in durable goods", July 1989.
89/32	Peter HAUG and Tawfik JELASSI	"Application and evaluation of a multi-criteria decision support system for the dynamic selection of U.S. manufacturing locations", May 1989.
89/33	Bernard SINCLAIR-DESGAGNÉ	"Design flexibility in monopsonistic industries", May 1989.
89/34	Sumantra GHOSHAL and Nittin NOHRIA	"Requisite variety versus shared values: managing corporate-division relationships in the M-Form organisation", May 1989.
89/35	Jean DERMINE and Pierre HILLION	"Deposit rate ceilings and the market value of banks: The case of France 1971-1981", May 1989.
89/36	Martin KILDUFF	"A dispositional approach to social networks: the case of organizational choice", May 1989.
89/37	Manfred KETS DE VRIES	"The organisational fool: balancing a leader's hubris", May 1989.
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89/40	Balaji CHAKRAVARTHY	"Management systems for innovation and productivity", June 1989.
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89/49	Jean DERMINE	"Home country control and mutual recognition", July 1989.
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89/55	H. SCHUTTE	"Euro-Japanese cooperation in information technology", September 1989.
89/56	Wilfried VANHONACKER and Lydia PRICE	"On the practical usefulness of meta-analysis results", September 1989.
89/57	Taekwon KIM, Lars-Hendrik RÖLLER and Mihkel TOMBAK	"Market growth and the diffusion of multiproduct technologies", September 1989.
89/58 (EP,TM)	Lars-Hendrik RÖLLER and Mihkel TOMBAK	"Strategic aspects of flexible production technologies", October 1989.
89/59 (OB)	Manfred KETS DE VRIES, Daphna ZEVADI, Alain NOEL and Mihkel TOMBAK	"Locus of control and entrepreneurship: a three-country comparative study", October 1989.
89/60 (TM)	Enver YUCESAN and Lee SCHRUBEN	"Simulation graphs for design and analysis of discrete event simulation models", October 1989.
89/61 (All)	Susan SCHNEIDER and Arnoud DE MEYER	"Interpreting and responding to strategic issues: The impact of national culture", October 1989.
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89/65 (TM, AC, FIN)	Soumitra DUTTA and Piero BONISSONE	"MARS: A mergers and acquisitions reasoning system", November 1989.
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89/67 (FIN)	Peter BOSSAERTS and Pierre HILLION	"Market microstructure effects of government intervention in the foreign exchange market", December 1989.

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90/01 TM/EP/AC	B. SINCLAIR-DESGAGNÉ	"Unavoidable Mechanisms", January 1990.
90/02 EP	Michael BURDA	"Monopolistic Competition, Costs of Adjustment, and the Behaviour of European Manufacturing Employment", January 1990.
90/03 TM	Arnoud DE MEYER	"Management of Communication in International Research and Development", January 1990.
90/04 FIN/EP	Gabriel HAWAWINI and Eric RAJENDRA	"The Transformation of the European Financial Services Industry: From Fragmentation to Integration", January 1990.
90/05 FIN/EP	Gabriel HAWAWINI and Bertrand JACQUILLAT	"European Equity Markets: Toward 1992 and Beyond", January 1990.

90/06 FIN/EP	Gabriel HAWAWINI and Eric RAJENDRA	"Integration of European Equity Markets: Implications of Structural Change for Key Market Participants to and Beyond 1992", January 1990.
90/07 FIN/EP	Gabriel HAWAWINI	"Stock Market Anomalies and the Pricing of Equity on the Tokyo Stock Exchange", January 1990.
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90/09 EP/FIN	Alberto GIOVANNINI and Jae WON PARK	"Capital Controls and International Trade Finance", January 1990.
90/10 TM	Joyce BRYER and Tawfik JELASSI	"The Impact of Language Theories on DSS Dialog", January 1990.
90/11 TM	Enver YUCESAN	"An Overview of Frequency Domain Methodology for Simulation Sensitivity Analysis", January 1990.
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90/14 TM	Albert ANGEHRN and Hans-Jakob LÜTHI	"Visual Interactive Modelling and Intelligent DSS: Putting Theory Into Practice", January 1990.
90/15 TM	Arnoud DE MEYER, Dirk DESCHOOLMEESTER, Rudy MOENAERT and Jan BARBE	"The Internal Technological Renewal of a Business Unit with a Mature Technology", January 1990.
90/16 FIN	Richard LEVICH and Ingo WALTER	"Tax-Driven Regulatory Drag: European Financial Centers in the 1990's", January 1990.
90/17 FIN	Nathalie DIERKENS	"Information Asymmetry and Equity Issues", Revised January 1990.
90/18 MKT	Wilfried VANHONACKER	"Managerial Decision Rules and the Estimation of Dynamic Sales Response Models", Revised January 1990.
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90/22 FIN	Ingo WALTER	"European Financial Integration and Its Implications for the United States", February 1990.
90/23 EP/SM	Damien NEVEN	"EEC Integration towards 1992: Some Distributional Aspects", Revised December 1989
90/24 FIN/EP	Lars Tyge NIELSEN	"Positive Prices in CAPM", January 1990.
90/25 FIN/EP	Lars Tyge NIELSEN	"Existence of Equilibrium in CAPM", January 1990.
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90/28 TM	Arnoud DE MEYER	"The Manufacturing Contribution to Innovation", February 1990.

90/29 FIN/AC	Nathalie DIERKENS	"A Discussion of Correct Measures of Information Asymmetry", January 1990.
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90/31 MKT/EP	David GAUTSCHI and Roger BETANCOURT	"What Determines U.S. Retail Margins?", February 1990.
90/32 SM	Srinivasan BALAK-RISHNAN and Mitchell KOZA	"Information Asymmetry, Adverse Selection and Joint-Ventures: Theory and Evidence", Revised, January 1990.
90/33 OB	Caren SIEHL, David BOWEN and Christine PEARSON	"The Role of Rites of Integration in Service Delivery", March 1990.
90/34 FIN/EP	Jean DERMINE	"The Gains from European Banking Integration, a Call for a Pro-Active Competition Policy", April 1990.
90/35 EP	Jae Won PARK	"Changing Uncertainty and the Time-Varying Risk Premia in the Term Structure of Nominal Interest Rates", December 1988, Revised March 1990.
90/36 TM	Arnoud DE MEYER	"An Empirical Investigation of Manufacturing Strategies in European Industry", April 1990.
90/37 TM/OB/SM	William CATS-BARIL	"Executive Information Systems: Developing an Approach to Open the Possibles", April 1990.
90/38 MKT	Wilfried VANHONACKER	"Managerial Decision Behaviour and the Estimation of Dynamic Sales Response Models", (Revised February 1990).
90/39 TM	Louis LE BLANC and Tawfik JELASSI	"An Evaluation and Selection Methodology for Expert System Shells", May 1990.
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90/41 FIN/EP	Gabriel HAWAWINI, Itzhak SWARY and Ik HWAN JANG	"Capital Market Reaction to the Announcement of Interstate Banking Legislation", March 1990.
90/42 MKT	Joel STECKEL and Wilfried VANHONACKER	"Cross-Validating Regression Models in Marketing Research", (Revised April 1990).
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90/44 OB	Gilles AMADO, Claude FAUCHEUX and André LAURENT	"Organisational Change and Cultural Realities: Franco-American Contrasts", April 1990.
90/45 TM	Soumitra DUTTA and Piero BONISSONE	"Integrating Case Based and Rule Based Reasoning: The Possibilistic Connection", May 1990.
90/46 TM	Spyros MAKRIDAKIS and Michèle HIBON	"Exponential Smoothing: The Effect of Initial Values and Loss Functions on Post-Sample Forecasting Accuracy".
90/47 MKT	Lydia PRICE and Wilfried VANHONACKER	"Improper Sampling in Natural Experiments: Limitations on the Use of Meta-Analysis Results in Bayesian Updating", Revised May 1990.
90/48 EP	Jae WON PARK	"The Information in the Term Structure of Interest Rates: Out-of-Sample Forecasting Performance", June 1990.
90/49 TM	Soumitra DUTTA	"Approximate Reasoning by Analogy to Answer Null Queries", June 1990.
90/50 EP	Daniel COHEN and Charles WYPLOSZ	"Price and Trade Effects of Exchange Rates Fluctuations and the Design of Policy Coordination", April 1990.

90/51 EP	Michael BURDA and Charles WYPLOSZ	"Gross Labour Market Flows in Europe: Some Stylized Facts", June 1990.
90/52 FIN	Lars Tyge NIELSEN	"The Utility of Infinite Menus", June 1990.
90/53 EP	Michael Burda	"The Consequences of German Economic and Monetary Union", June 1990.
90/54 EP	Damien NEVEN and Colin MEYER	"European Financial Regulation: A Framework for Policy Analysis", (Revised May 1990).
90/55 EP	Michael BURDA and Stefan GERLACH	"Intertemporal Prices and the US Trade Balance", (Revised July 1990).
90/56 EP	Damien NEVEN and Lars-Hendrik RÖLLER	"The Structure and Determinants of East-West Trade: A Preliminary Analysis of the Manufacturing Sector", July 1990
90/57 FIN/EP/ TM	Lars Tyge NIELSEN	Common Knowledge of a Multivariate Aggregate Statistic", July 1990
90/58 FIN/EP/TM	Lars Tyge NIELSEN	"Common Knowledge of Price and Expected Cost in an Oligopolistic Market", August 1990
90/59 FIN	Jean DERMINE and Lars-Hendrik RÖLLER	"Economies of Scale and Scope in the French Mutual Funds (SICAV) Industry", August 1990
90/60 TM	Peri IZ and Tawfik JELASSI	"An Interactive Group Decision Aid for Multiobjective Problems: An Empirical Assessment", September 1990
90/61 TM	Pankaj CHANDRA and Mihkel TOMBAK	"Models for the Evlauation of Manufacturing Flexibility", August 1990
90/62 EP	Damien NEVEN and Menno VAN DIJK	"Public Policy Towards TV Broadcasting in the Netherlands", August 1990
90/63 SM	Sumantra GHOSHAL and Eleanor WESTNEY	"Organising Competitor Analysis Systems", August 1990
90/64 SM	Sumantra GHOSHAL	"Internal Differentiation and Corporate Performance: Case of the Multinational Corporation", August 1990
90/65 EP	Charles WYPLOSZ	"A Note on the Real Exchange Rate Effect of German Unification", August 1990
90/66 TM/SE/FIN	Soumitra DUTTA and Piero BONISSONE	"Computer Support for Strategic and Tactical Planning in Mergers and Acquisitions", September 1990
90/67 TM/SE/FIN	Soumitra DUTTA and Piero BONISSONE	"Integrating Prior Cases and Expert Knowledge In a Mergers and Acquisitions Reasoning System", September 1990
90/68 TM/SE	Soumitra DUTTA	"A Framework and Methodology for Enhancing the Business Impact of Artificial Intelligence Applications", September 1990
90/69 TM	Soumitra DUTTA	"A Model for Temporal Reasoning in Medical Expert Systems", September 1990
90/70 TM	Albert ANGEHRN	"'Triple C': A Visual Interactive MCDSS", September 1990
90/71 MKT	Philip PARKER and Hubert GATIGNON	"Competitive Effects in Diffusion Models: An Empirical Analysis", September 1990
90/72 TM	Enver YÜCESAN	"Analysis of Markov Chains Using Simulation Graph Models", October 1990
90/73 TM	Arnoud DE MEYER and Kasra FERDOWS	"Removing the Barriers in Manufacturing", October 1990
90/74 SM	Sumantra GHOSHAL and Nitin NOHRIA	"Requisite Complexity: Organising Headquarters-Subsidiary Relations in MNCs", October 1990

90/75 MKT	Roger BETANCOURT and David GAUTSCHI	"The Outputs of Retail Activities: Concepts, Measurement and Evidence", October 1990
90/76 MKT	Wilfried VANHONACKER	"Managerial Decision Behaviour and the Estimation of Dynamic Sales Response Models", Revised October 1990
90/77 MKT	Wilfried VANHONACKER	"Testing the Koyck Scheme of Sales Response to Advertising: An Aggregation-Independent Autocorrelation Test", October 1990
90/78 EP	Michael BURDA and Stefan GERLACH	"Exchange Rate Dynamics and Currency Unification: The Ostmark - DM Rate", October 1990
90/79 TM	Anil GABA	"Inferences with an Unknown Noise Level in a Bernoulli Process", October 1990
90/80 TM	Anil GABA and Robert WINKLER	"Using Survey Data in Inferences about Purchase Behaviour", October 1990
90/81 TM	Tawfik JELASSI	"Du Présent au Futur: Bilan et Orientations des Systèmes Interactifs d'Aide à la Décision," October 1990
90/82 EP	Charles WYPLOSZ	"Monetary Union and Fiscal Policy Discipline," November 1990
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90/84 MKT	Philip M. PARKER	"The Effect of Advertising on Price and Quality: The Optometric Industry Revisited," December 1990
90/85 MKT	Avijit GHOSH and Vikas TIBREWALA	"Optimal Timing and Location in Competitive Markets," November 1990
90/86 EP/TM	Olivier CADOT and Bernard SINCLAIR-DESGAGNE	"Prudence and Success in Politics," November 1990
90/87 FIN/EP	Lars Tyge NIELSEN	"Existence of Equilibrium in CAPM: Further Results", December 1990
90/88 OB/MKT	Susan C. SCHNEIDER and Reinhard ANGELMAR	"Cognition in Organisational Analysis: Who's Minding the Store?" Revised, December 1990
90/89 OB	Manfred F.R. KETS DE VRIES	"The CEO Who Couldn't Talk Straight and Other Tales from the Board Room," December 1990
90/90 MKT	Philip PARKER	"Price Elasticity Dynamics over the Adoption Lifecycle: An Empirical Study," December 1990

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91/01 TM/SM	Luk VAN WASSENHOVE, Leonard FORTUIN and Paul VAN BEEK	"Operational Research Can Do More for Managers Than They Think!," January 1991
91/02 TM/SM	Luk VAN WASSENHOVE, Leonard FORTUIN and Paul VAN BEEK	"Operational Research and Environment," January 1991
91/03 FIN	Pekka HIETALA and Timo LÖYTTYNIEMI	"An Implicit Dividend Increase in Rights Issues: Theory and Evidence," January 1991
91/04 FIN	Lars Tyge NIELSEN	"Two-Fund Separation, Factor Structure and Robustness," January 1991
91/05 OB	Susan SCHNEIDER	"Managing Boundaries in Organisations," January 1991
91/06 OB	Manfred KETS DE VRIES, Danny MILLER and Alain NOEL	"Understanding the Leader-Strategy Interface: Application of the Strategic Relationship Interview Method," January 1990 (89/11, revised April 1990)

91/07 EP	Olivier CADOT	**"Lending to Insolvent Countries: A Paradoxical Story,"** January 1991
91/08 EP	Charles WYPLOSZ	**"Post-Reform East and West: Capital Accumulation and the Labour Mobility Constraint,"** January 1991
91/09 TM	Spyros MAKRIDAKIS	**"What can we Learn from Failure?"**, February 1991
91/10 TM	Luc Van WASSENHOVE and C. N. POTTS	**"Integrating Scheduling with Batching and Lot-Sizing: A Review of Algorithms and Complexity"**, February 1991
91/11 TM	Luc VAN WASSENHOVE et al.	**"Multi-Item Lotsizing in Capacitated Multi-Stage Serial Systems"**, February 1991
91/12 TM	Albert ANGEHRN	**"Interpretative Computer Intelligence: A Link between Users, Models and Methods in DSS"**, February 1991
91/13 EP	Michael BURDA	**"Labor and Product Markets in Czechoslovakia and the Ex-GDR: A Twin Study"**, February 1991
91/14 MKT	Roger BETANCOURT and David GAUTSCHI	**"The Output of Retail Activities: French Evidence"**, February 1991
91/15 OB	Manfred F.R. KETS DE VRIES	**"Exploding the Myth about Rational Organisations and Executives"**, March 1991
91/16 TM	Arnoud DE MEYER and Kasra FERDOWS et.al.	**"Factories of the Future: Executive Summary of the 1990 International Manufacturing Futures Survey"**, March 1991
91/17 TM	Dirk CATTRYSSE, Roelof KUIK, Marc SALOMON and Luk VAN WASSENHOVE	**"Heuristics for the Discrete Lotsizing and Scheduling Problem with Setup Times"**, March 1991
91/18 TM	C.N. POTTS and Luk VAN WASSENHOVE	**"Approximation Algorithms for Scheduling a Single Machine to Minimize Total Late Work"**,
91/19 MKT	Vikas TIBREWALA and Bruce BUCHANAN	**"An Aggregate Test of Purchase Regularity"**, March 1991
91/20 MKT	Darius SABAVALA and Vikas TIBREWALA	**"Monitoring Short-Run Changes in Purchasing Behaviour"**, March 1991
91/21 SM	Sumantra GHOSHAL, Harry KORINE and Gabriel SZULANSKI	**"Interunit Communication within MNCs: The Influence of Formal Structure Versus Integrative Processes"**, April 1991
91/22 EP	David GOOD, Lars-Hendrik RÖLLER and Robin SICKLES	**"EC Integration and the Structure of the Franco-American Airline Industries: Implications for Efficiency and Welfare"**, April 1991
91/23 TM	Spyros MAKRIDAKIS and Michèle HIBON	**"Exponential Smoothing: The Effect of Initial Values and Loss Functions on Post-Sample Forecasting Accuracy"**, April 1991 (Revision of 90/46)
91/24 TM	Louis LE BLANC and Tawfik JELASSI	**"An Empirical Assessment of Choice Models for Software Evaluation and Selection"**, May 1991
91/25 SM/TM	Luk N. VAN WASSENHOVE and Charles J. CORBETT	**"Trade-Offs? What Trade-Offs?"** April 1991
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