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**Brazil: In Search of a
Role on the Global Stage**

Lourdes CASANOVA
Julian KASSUM
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Lourdes Casanova*

Julian Kassum**

The other two working papers are: Casanova, L. Kassum, J. 2013. *Brazilian Emerging Multinationals: In Search of a Second Wind* INSEAD Working paper 2013. And Casanova, L. Kassum, J. 2013. *From Soft to Hard Power: In Search of Brazil's Winning Blend* INSEAD Working papers 2013.
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* Lecturer, Strategy Department, at INSEAD, Boulevard de Constance, 77305 Fontainebleau, France. Email: lourdes.casanova@insead.edu

** Independent Consultant, International Economic Relations, Buenos Aires, Argentina.
Email: jkassum@gmail.com

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Abstract

This is one of three working papers (with Casanova, Kassum 2013a, and Casanova, Kassum 2013b) to examine the role of Brazil as an emerging global power. Is Brazil's rise on the global stage barely beginning, or has it already hit a plateau, held back by domestic challenges and the external constraints of the global governance system? In this third paper, we trace the country's impressive diplomatic take-off and examine the tension between its global ambitions and its inward-looking inclinations.

The paradox behind Brazil's new-found global role

Brazil's new role in world affairs offers an intriguing paradox. The country is both praised for its role as a champion of multilateralism and as the voice of the Global South¹ as well as criticized for being overly protectionist and a staunch defender of its domestic interests as an emerging economy. While the same can be said of many of today's rising powers, the contrast is particularly stark in the case of Brazil.

Despite this apparent paradox, the South American giant has achieved significant milestones in recent years. The appointment of Roberto Carvalho de Azevêdo in May 2013 as Director-General of the World Trade Organization – two years after the selection of José Graziano da Silva as Director-General of the Food and Agriculture Organization – has once again put Brazilian diplomacy front and center stage. Azevêdo's victory over the candidate proposed by Mexico had a special significance, marking Brazil's ascendancy over its main Latin American contender for global influence. The rivalry between Brazil and Mexico is not only economic; it is also a rivalry between two political orientations. While the Mexican government supports open markets and close relations with the United States, Brasilia favors a more developmentalist approach and seeks to accelerate the move towards a multi-polar world.


This paper explores Brazil's diplomatic rise and examines the nature of its global message to the world. We begin with a description of the strategies that Brazil has successfully pursued to raise its political and institutional profile in the global governance system (Part I). We then analyze the tension between the globalist Brazil that fully embraces its global role and contributes to the creation of common public goods and solutions, and the more inward-looking Brazil that is generally reluctant to interfere in the internal affairs of other countries or to allow others to interfere in its own (Part II).

I. Brazil's diplomatic ascension

To gain political and institutional power on the international scene and advance towards its goal of obtaining a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council, Brazil has deployed four complementary strategies. It has (i) formed coalitions with other emerging nations in the context of multilateral forums, (ii) joined top-level diplomatic groupings at the core of the global governance system, (iii) led regional integration efforts, (iv) positioned itself as a champion of South-South cooperation. (Figure 1 summarizes the different associations where Brazil is present).

¹ The nations of Africa, Latin America, and developing Asia are collectively known as the Global South.

Figure 1: Main multilateral institutions, diplomatic groupings and Latin American regional bodies in which Brazil participates (organizations which include only emerging markets indicated in bold)



Brazil's multilateral breakthrough

Brazil's pro-active diplomatic agenda first became evident within the sphere of multilateral institutions, notably at the World Trade Organization (WTO). As the world's second biggest agricultural superpower (after the United States), the country has emerged as one of the most vocal supporters of the Doha Development Agenda.² To advance Brazil's interests in agricultural trade liberalization,³ Celso Amorim, Minister of External Relations under the Lula Administration, engaged in a bold negotiation strategy which has transformed the way global trade talks are conducted within the WTO (Da Motta Veiga, 2004). In 2003, Brazil created and

² The Doha Development Agenda is the most recent round of WTO multilateral trade negotiations, launched in November 2001 in Doha (Qatar).

³ Brazil continues to lobby for an end to agricultural subsidies in Europe, the US and Japan, and to open up the sector to free trade. Agriculture is a key sector for developing countries who want to be able to export their products to Europe, the US and Japan.

took the leadership of a coalition of 23 developing countries known as the G20,⁴ to jointly negotiate an ambitious deal on agriculture as an alternative to the framework proposed by the US and the European Union. The creation of this new “Global South” coalition transformed the balance of power between developed and developing countries in the WTO. Notably it prompted the spectacular breakdown of the 5th WTO Ministerial Conference in Cancún (Mexico) in September 2003. Almost ten years later, the Doha Development Agenda remains in an impasse.

Although the G20 experience was not successful in obtaining significant concessions from the advanced economies, it propelled Brazil into the ranks of the top players in the WTO. Together with India, Brazil is the only emerging country to have been included in every new group of core negotiating states (such as the “Group of 4”, the “Five-Interested Parties”, and the “Group of 6”), that were established to supplant the “old quad” (Canada, the European Union, Japan and the US), which dominated negotiations behind the scenes. Brazil is also one of the most intensive users of the WTO dispute settlement system. Over the last decade it has won landmark disputes against the US and the EU over their heavily subsidized cotton and sugar interests. Brazil’s most resounding victory came in May 2013 with the election of Roberto Azevêdo, its former Permanent Representative to the WTO, as Director-General of the organization.

Brazil’s strategy of siding with other emerging countries has been successfully replicated in another major multilateral forum: the UN climate change negotiations. The 2009 UN Climate Change Conference in Copenhagen was marked by the emergence of a new bloc of major developing countries (Brazil, South Africa, India and China), referred to as the BASIC countries. These four committed to act jointly at UN conferences on climate change and to resist any proposals that would be detrimental to their interests and those of the developing world. Their influence in Copenhagen was such that the United States was forced to negotiate the final Copenhagen Accord directly with them. While the four do not agree on all aspects of the negotiations, they continue to meet separately and to speak with one voice within the UN. Through its active participation in the group, Brazil has firmly established itself as a force to be reckoned with in shaping future global climate change initiatives (Qi, 2011).

Joining high-level diplomatic groupings

The idea of creating a coalition of Southern states to influence multilateral negotiations has its roots in a wider, more institutionalized process initiated in 2003 by three emerging countries known as IBSA, the “India, Brazil and South Africa Dialogue Forum”. Formally established by the Brasília Declaration of June 2003, IBSA describes itself as “a coordinating mechanism amongst three emerging countries, three multiethnic and multicultural democracies, which are determined to contribute to the construction of a new international architecture, to bring their voices together on global issues and to deepen their ties in various areas.”⁵ In successive declarations IBSA has made clear its objective to push for a comprehensive reform of the United Nations – in particular the Security Council – in order to give a greater voice to developing countries on global political and security issues. As such, Brazil’s participation in IBSA

⁴ The G20 group of developing countries currently includes 23 members countries (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, China, Cuba, Ecuador, Egypt, Guatemala, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, South Africa, Tanzania, Thailand, Uruguay, Venezuela and Zimbabwe). The group only exists in the context of the WTO and is distinct from the similarly named governance forum, the Group of 20 (G20), which gathers the heads of state and was launched to address the global economic and financial crisis of 2008-2009 and government of the world’s twenty most important economies.

⁵ See IBSA’s website: <http://www.ibsa-trilateral.org/>

represents a key stepping stone in the country's strategy to obtain a permanent seat on the UN Security Council, a longstanding goal for which Brasília has also sought (with mixed results) to rally support from other Latin American countries.

Brazil's participation in IBSA helped affirm its standing as a leader of the emerging world with a clear global agenda. However, the quantum leap in terms of global status and influence came from its membership of two other diplomatic groupings which enjoy a much higher political profile and have emerged as major poles of the global governance system: the Group of 20 (G20)⁶ and the BRICS group of emerging powers.

In the G20's four years of existence as a top-level economic forum, Brazil has made its voice heard on a number of key issues on the agenda. In 2010, it played an influential role in the G20's decision to accelerate a governance and quota reform of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), whose implementation will make Brazil one of the top 10 shareholders of the Fund. The same year, Guido Mantega, Brazil's Minister of Finance since 2006, gained worldwide attention for denouncing a looming "currency war" fed by loose monetary policies in the US and China's alleged currency manipulation. In the ongoing debate over the best way to tackle the euro-zone's debt crisis, Mantega has been an outspoken critic of Europe's austerity measures and their effects on the wider global economy.⁷ Another Brazilian battleground was the defense of capital controls (such as taxes and restrictions on foreign investments) as an acceptable policy measure to manage the inflows and outflows of "hot money" in emerging markets. In 2009, Brazil began to introduce capital controls to prevent the *real* from appreciating too much, prior to a policy reversal in June 2013 to stop a sharp depreciation of the currency. Finally, Brazil has taken a rather defensive stance in G20 discussions on food security and the volatility of food commodity prices. Brasília notably managed to block several G20 proposals which would have had adverse effects on its farming sector.

Brazil's influence within the G20 owes a lot to the BRICS, a grouping of five of the most visible rising powers on the international stage: Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. Initially BRIC (renamed BRICS with South Africa's inclusion in 2010), the role of this increasingly formal coalition is to encourage cooperation among its member countries and to speak with a collective voice in global and multilateral settings. While the acronym BRIC initially came from the investment community,⁸ the foreign ministers of Brazil and Russia, Celso Amorim and Sergey Lavrov, played an instrumental role in making the group a political reality and establishing it as a permanent diplomatic platform. The leaders of the four countries have met in Russia (2009),

⁶ The Group of 20 (G20) gathers the world's twenty most important advanced and emerging economies (Australia, Argentina, Brazil, Canada, China, Germany, France, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, South Korea, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States and the European Union). It meets annually at the level of heads of state and government. In 2009, the group was self-proclaimed as the "premier forum for [their] international economic cooperation".

⁷ "Mantega: Brazil accelerating despite global slump", *Reuters*, 28 May 2012

⁸ In 2001, Jim O'Neill, then Head of Global Economic Research at the investment bank Goldman Sachs, coined the term BRIC, an acronym standing for Brazil, Russia, India, and China—the four largest and rapidly growing developing countries that have come to symbolize the shift in global economic power. In 2011, Goldman Sachs launched another acronym, the MIST: Mexico, Indonesia, South Korea and Turkey trying to capture again the rising power of these new markets after the next 11 the institution had launched in 2005. BBVA Research in 2010 talked about the EAGLES, emerging and Growth-Leading Economies: China, India, China, India, Brazil, Indonesia, South Korea, Russia, Mexico, Egypt, Taiwan and Turkey. In this battle to better capture the new economic order, the Economist Intelligence Unit launched in 2009 the CIVETS: Colombia, India, Vietnam, Egypt, Thailand and South Africa.

Brazil (2010), China (2011), India (2012) and South Africa (2013), and the coalition is one of the most commented-on innovations on the global political scene.

The logic of Brazil's participation in the BRICS is largely similar to that of its involvement in IBSA (Soulé-Kohndou, 2011). Although China and Russia have not openly supported Brazil's demand for a permanent seat on the Security Council, Brasília hopes to gain credibility by deepening its political links with these two established powers. As many commentators have noted, divergences among the five countries' national interests will make it difficult for the BRICS to articulate a common vision on global issues (Valladão, 2006). However, they are starting to demonstrate an increasing level of cooperation. At their latest summit in March 2013 in Durban, South Africa, BRICS leaders announced that they would go ahead with the establishment of a BRICS-led New Development Bank to mobilize resources for infrastructure and sustainable development projects in BRICS and other emerging economies.

Brazil has also been an active participant at the annual Ibero-American Summit of Heads of State and Governments, which first met in Guadalajara, Mexico in 1991 and was most recently held in Cádiz, Spain in November 2012. This brings together representatives of 22 Spanish and Portuguese speaking countries (except Angola and Mozambique) and is promoted by Spain. The secretariat (Secretaría General Iberoamericana or SEGIB) is based in Madrid. The idea of the Summit is to promote political, economic, social and cultural cooperation. It was created as a 'Latin' Commonwealth in parallel with major Spanish investments in Latin America. Brazil has hosted the Summit once. Parallel to these meetings, a biennial European Union-Latin American summit has been held since 1999, the last one in Chile in January 2013. There is a certain disappointment with the fact that these meetings do not have much to show beyond a willingness to working together and cultural understanding. A certain fatigue can be detected in the different regional gatherings and summits of the EU with Latin America, prompting some rethinking of the best way to move forward.

It is also worth mentioning the Organization of American States (OAS), based in Washington, which groups all 35 nations in the Americas. The world's oldest regional organization held its first conference in 1889 with the aim of promoting democracy, human rights, security and development. The general assembly has convened every year since 1971 and is the main decision-making body. Brazil, a founding member of OAS, has hosted it twice.

Brazil's regional leadership

The BRICS countries participate in the grouping in an individual capacity but it is clear that they earned their entry ticket into the club thanks in large part to their regional influence. As the largest Latin American country both in terms of population and economic size, Brazil has played an instrumental role in the creation of the region's main integration processes. These include the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR), founded in 1991 by the Treaty of Asunción; the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR), whose constitutive treaty was signed in 2008 in Brasilia, and the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC), created in Mexico in 2010.⁹ All of these regional ventures enjoy strong Brazilian support. Brazil's President, Dilma Rousseff, has made clear on several occasions that South American and Latin American

⁹ DABENE, Olivier, "Le retour du Latino-Américanisme", *Le Devoir*, 15 May 2012

integration is a top priority of her foreign policy.¹⁰ The focus of Brazil's regional attention has been the promotion of UNASUR, a political and economic union of 12 South American countries, which excludes Mexico, its main political rival in Latin America. As a sign of its commitment to further political integration, Brazil has prompted UNASUR to establish a defense council to strengthen regional cooperation on security matters.

Brazil's regional leadership is far from absolute, however, and its influence is increasingly being nibbled away by the emergence of sub-regional initiatives, such as the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America (ALBA), led by Venezuela,¹¹ the Community of Andean Nations (CAN), and last but not least, the Pacific Alliance, a new regional trade grouping comprising Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru.¹² Formally launched in June 2012, the Pacific Alliance has already overtaken Mercosur as the most dynamic integration bloc in Latin America. Another symbol of the rise of pacific Latin American countries – from which Brazil is excluded – is the growing political energy spent by Chile, Mexico and Peru to successfully advance negotiations within the context of the Trans-Pacific Partnership, a proposed trade agreement between some of the major Asian and American economies from the Pacific Rim. This alliance represents 40% of Latin America's gross domestic product.

A champion of South-South cooperation

Beyond its regional policy, a distinctive feature of Brazilian diplomacy over the last decade, notably under the Lula presidency, has been the strong emphasis given to South-South relations (Amorim, 2011). Since the early 2000s, Brazil has fostered new links with countries and regions outside its traditional sphere of influence. In particular, it has forged closer relations with African countries, starting with the former Portuguese colonies Angola, Mozambique and Cape Verde. During his two terms as Brazil's president, Lula visited 25 African nations and doubled the number of Brazilian embassies on the continent.¹³ A second focal point of Brazilian's South-South diplomacy is the Middle East (Brun, 2011). In 2005, Brazil hosted the first South American-Arab Countries Summit (ASPA), with 22 heads of state and governments from the two regions. Two further summits took place in Doha (Qatar) in 2009 and in Lima (Peru) in October 2012.

Brazil is also looking to position itself as a mediator in Israeli-Palestinian negotiations. In December 2010, Brazil, which has good relations with Israel, initiated a wave of recognition of the Palestinian state by Latin American countries in an attempt to revive the peace process (Baeza, 2011). This was not the first time that Brazil had sought to fill the role of global mediator. In May 2010, in an effort to find a diplomatic solution to the longstanding stand-off between Iran and the Western powers over its nuclear program, Brazil and Turkey brokered a separate deal with Iran. The diplomatic maneuver, which was initially encouraged by

¹⁰ "Presidential message supports regional integration", Federal Senate of Brazil, 2 March 2012: <http://www12.senado.gov.br/internacional/en/2012/presidential-message-supports-regional-integration> [Accessed on 1 June 2013]

¹¹ Venezuela also joined the Mercosur in 2012.

¹² "Latin America cements 'Pacific Alliance'", *Financial Times*, May 24, 2013

¹³ KOZLOFF, Nikolas, "Is Brazil the next cop in Africa? The Pentagon seems to hope so", *Aljazeera*, June 2012: <http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2012/06/201263144317166915.html> [Accessed on 1 June 2013]; Brazil Gains Business and Influence as It Offers Aids and Loans to Africa", *The New York Times*, August 2012: http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/08/world/americas/brazil-gains-in-reaching-out-to-africa.html?_r=0 [Accessed on 1 June 2013]

Washington, was eventually dismissed by the United States and the European Union, despite broad support from other UN member states (Sotero, 2012).

II. The tension between two Brazils

While Brazil's growing clout in global affairs is indisputable, its precise role and message to the world remain unclear. On the one hand, it is characterized by a pro-active and progressive diplomacy, which it readily uses to represent the interests of the Global South. Its ambition is to change the system from within while maintaining good relations with established powers. On the other hand, Brazil retains the image of an inward-looking nation. This contradiction has become evident in both the economic and political arenas, where policy oscillates between self-centered motives and a desire to take the lead on global issues.

Protectionism vs. open trade

The appointment of Roberto Azevêdo as the new head of the WTO is symptomatic of Brazil's duality. For many observers the choice of a Brazilian diplomat came as a surprise given the country's reputation for favoring protectionist policies. According to Global Trade Alert, the country has implemented 56 trade-restrictive measures since November 2008. Only eight other countries have resorted to protectionism more often.¹⁴ The world's sixth economy ranks a lowly 67th (out of 75) in the 2013 edition of the Open Market Index by the International Chamber of Commerce, and ranks the lowest among G20 and BRICS members.¹⁵ However, as stated above, Brazil is a historical supporter of the Doha Development Agenda. In January 2011, Brazil's trade minister joined his counterparts from India and South Africa to call for the conclusion of multilateral trade talks as early as possible. During the G20 summit of Los Cabos in June 2012, President Rousseff proposed to re-open the Doha Round by 2014, though the idea gained little traction among other G20 leaders.

Contrary to what one might think, the North-South divide was not the main force behind the victory of Azevêdo. He clearly enjoyed the backing of the BRICS bloc of emerging economies, Portuguese-speaking countries and a wide range of developing nations from Latin America, Asia and Africa. But according to Matias Spektor, Azevêdo was also the preferred candidate of the European Commission and of many European countries. In Washington, his appointment was well received, in spite of the official support given by the US administration to the Mexican candidate, which was mainly motivated by domestic politics.¹⁶ Beyond the personal qualities of the Brazilian diplomat, the broad support (or at least lack of formal opposition) enjoyed by Azevêdo is partly explained by the tacit wish of the US and the European Union to have Brazil confront its contradictions regarding trade policy matters. In that sense, the election of Azevêdo may be a Pyrrhic victory for Brazil. As Director-General of the WTO he will no longer represent the interests of the Brazilian government but will clearly be expected to help build bridges between the positions of Brazil and those of its trading partners.

Mercosur's internal disputes over protectionist measures provide another illustration of Brazil's ambiguous position on trade matters. In 2011, Argentina and Brazil imposed non-automatic

¹⁴ <http://www.globaltradealert.org/news/brazils-finance-minister-uses-gta-data-refute-allegations-protectionism>
[Accessed on 10 June 2013]

¹⁵ "Brazil performs poorly in market openness", ANBA: <http://www2.anba.com.br/noticia/20744702/macro-en/brazil-performs-poorly-in-market-openness/> [Accessed on 11 June 2013]

¹⁶ SPEKTOR Matias, "Os porquês de Azevêdo", *A Folha de São Paulo*, May 15, 2013

import licenses on a range of goods traded between the two nations. Goods piled up at the border as Brazil took retaliatory measures to stall imports on a host of items from Argentina. The automotive industry was particularly targeted. The dispute continued for more than a year until both countries signed an umpteenth deal.¹⁷ In 2012, Mexico agreed under pressure from Brasilia to limit its automotive exports to Brazil despite the economic agreement signed between Mexico and Mercosur in 2002. This move prompted Argentina to suspend its own part of the agreement with Mexico in an effort to gain further concessions. Mexico was about to take action via the WTO but dropped its complaint after the two countries signed a more limited automobile trade pact. These are just two recent examples of the recurrent internal disputes that have plagued the Mercosur union over the last decade,¹⁸ prompting the *Financial Times* to ask: “If Brazil cannot boost regional trade, how can it boost trade globally?”¹⁹

Even on agriculture, an area in which Brazil has taken leadership by challenging the subsidies of advanced economies, the position of Brasilia is not always as pro-South as it may seem. The country, which accounts for 19% of the world’s arable land, is one of the dominant exporters of food commodities for international markets. As such, it is de facto one of the main regulators of the global food supply. However, Brazil’s response to the challenge of food insecurity, which directly concerns one billion people around the world and threatens to affect another billion, has been largely inaudible. In the G20, it even sided with the United States, Britain and Australia to oppose measures to curb speculation in food commodities financial markets, which is considered a major source of food prices volatility. While Brazil has made impressive strides in reducing food insecurity at home, it is not clear whether its agricultural commercial interests are compatible with the interests of net food-importing countries around the world.

Nonintervention vs. human rights

Similarly, Brazil’s commitment to the worldwide protection of human rights has been difficult to gauge in recent years. Relations with Iran illustrate the country’s changeable foreign policy parameters: while Lula acted in favor of a strategic rapprochement with Iran’s president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, President Rousseff has stated that she will not support Iran unless its government seriously addresses the issue of human rights.

A similar hesitation can be observed regarding Brazil’s attitude toward humanitarian intervention. Brazilian diplomats regard sovereignty and non-interference as sacrosanct principles, a longstanding position which explains why in March 2011 Brazil abstained from voting on the UN resolution which approved a no-fly zone over Libya in order to protect Libyan civilians. The fact that NATO went beyond its mandate by carrying out air strikes against Kadhafi targets subsequently reinforced Brazil’s conviction that humanitarian intervention is in reality another way for Western powers to enforce imperialist policies of regime change. This mistrust is one of the major reasons behind Brasilia’s relative silence on the current violence in Syria.

However, Brazil cannot be said to be an unconditional defender of nonintervention and national sovereignty.²⁰ It has long assumed a leadership role in the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), a peacekeeping mission directly involved with the establishment

¹⁷ “Argentina, Brazil Sign Car Deal, Easing Trade Tension”, *Wall Street Journal*, June 29, 2012

¹⁸ “Mercosur’s trial by adversity”, *The Economist*, May 25, 2000

¹⁹ “A win for Brazil’s WTO rainbow diplomacy – now for the hard part”, *Financial Times*, May 8, 2013

²⁰ BRUN Elodie, “Non le Brésil n’est pas souverainiste!”, *Le Monde*, February 18, 2013

of a transitional government after the coup d'état of 2004. The mission's military component has been led by the Brazilian army and the force is under Brazilian command. Brasilia was willing to infringe the principle of noninterference as it saw this involvement as an opportunity to establish its regional leadership as a military power, a position criticized as a new "Brazilian imperialism" by some civil society organizations.²¹ Since 2011, Brazil has also led the Maritime Task Force of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). As explained by Brazilian Defense Minister Celso Amorim, "As Brazil increases its presence on the world scene, we are accepting new challenges."²²

For Brazilian civil society organizations, the somewhat inconsistent positioning of Brasilia over matters concerning human rights and sovereignty should prompt it to rethink its long-standing deference to the principle of non-intervention, and become a more committed advocate of democracy and human rights.²³ Conectas, a Brazilian human rights organization which actively monitors Brazil's foreign policy, has regularly denounced the passivity of Brasilia regarding the massive violations of human rights in Syria since 2011.

To demonstrate that its reluctance towards foreign intervention is more the result of a genuine concern over the negative consequences of the use of force than a covert means of defending its own sovereignty against possible future interferences, Brazil's diplomacy has pioneered an innovative idea that could have strong repercussions in the future. During her opening speech to the UN General Assembly in September 2011, President Rousseff argued that military deployments for humanitarian purposes should be held responsible for the unwanted damage they provoke, and that better mechanisms were needed to keep such damage to a minimum – a concept she referred to as "responsibility while protecting" (RwP).²⁴ RwP highlights the need for those undertaking humanitarian intervention to consider alternative measures first, to take extra care when using military intervention to protect civilians, and to report continually to the United Nations Security Council.²⁵

While military interventionism has been increasingly criticized as an unsatisfactory solution,²⁶ the Brazilian concept of RwP is still a work in progress. The idea has been judged by the Western powers as too restrictive, potentially leading to nonintervention. Moreover, there is no consensus among the emerging powers. Indeed the Syrian crisis has exacerbated the divergence between them. In the face of opposition from Russia and China, Brazil was unable to include any reference to RwP in BRICS declarations. As several observers have noted, Brazil seems today less keen to pursue the development of RwP, at least not as vigorously as before.²⁷

In search of a third way

²¹ <http://blackagendareport.com/content/brazil%E2%80%99s-haitian-training-ground> [Accessed on 10 June 2013]

²² <http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Politics/2012/May-21/174079-brazils-defense-minister-honors-departing-unifil-flagship.ashx#ixzz2Vv8pniN1> [Accessed on 1 June 2013]

²³ <http://www.thedialogue.org/page.cfm?pageID=32&pubID=2273> [Accessed on 10 June 2013]

²⁴ <http://www.postwesternworld.com/2011/11/28/brazil-and-the-responsibility-when-protecting/> [Accessed on 10 June 2013]

²⁵ <http://www.du.edu/korbel/hrhw/workingpapers/2013/71-pattison-2013.pdf> [Accessed on 10 June 2013]

²⁶ http://www.lemonde.fr/international/chat/2011/04/13/crises-en-monde-arabe-et-interventions-mise-a-l-ecart-ou-nouvelle-chance-pour-les-emergents_1507099_3210.html [Accessed on 10 June 2013]

²⁷ <http://www.du.edu/korbel/hrhw/workingpapers/2013/71-pattison-2013.pdf> [Accessed on 10 June 2013]

The country's position as an emerging global power is an interesting one. A vibrant democracy, which seeks to project positive and progressive values to the outside world, Brazil has long been opposed to the use of force in international relations and has consistently promoted dialogue and cooperation as a way to solve global issues and local conflicts. As a public defender of multilateralism, it has always made clear that the global governance system should be reformed in order to better reflect the new equilibriums of political and economic power. Successes at home on the political, economic and social fronts lend considerable legitimacy to the alternative means to spread peace and prosperity globally advocated by Brasilia.

Since 2003, Brazilian diplomacy has on numerous occasions championed the interests of the world's poorest nations. It has used its membership in the BRICS to leverage its influence in the global governance system. It has clearly positioned itself as a contender for a permanent seat at the UN Security Council. But less clear is what Brazil stands for exactly. In the economic sphere, the country's commercial interests and protectionist tendencies make it an uncertain 'solution provider' for reforming the multilateral trading system and durably reducing food insecurity. In the political sphere, Brazil's visceral attachment to nonintervention and noninterference limits its role as a defender of global peace and human rights.

As it gains influence in world affairs as result of its diplomatic activism, or simply due to its ever-growing economic weight, Brazil inevitably takes on new responsibilities. To sustain its move to global power status, it will be increasingly expected to contribute to the design of the common good. In this context, the challenge for Brazil will be to identify and formulate "third way" alternatives which move away from the Western-dominated intellectual framework while going beyond the narrow defense of sovereignty and national interest which characterizes most of today's emerging powers.

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Europe Campus
Boulevard de Constance
77305 Fontainebleau Cedex, France
Tel: +33 (0)1 60 72 40 00
Fax: +33 (0)1 60 74 55 00/01

Asia Campus
1 Ayer Rajah Avenue, Singapore 138676
Tel: +65 67 99 53 88
Fax: +65 67 99 53 99

Abu Dhabi Campus
Muroor Road - Street No 4
P.O. Box 48049
Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates
Tel: +971 2 651 5200
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