CHANGE NAVIGATION STYLES AND CORPORATE REVITALIZATION

by

QUY N. HUY*

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* Assistant Professor of Strategy and Management at INSEAD, Boulevard de Constance, 77305 Fontainebleau Cedex, France.

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QUY N. HUY

Faculty of Management
McGill University
5730 McAlear Av.
Montreal, Quebec
Canada H4W 2G9
Tel: (514) 484-4273
Fax: (514) 398-3876
E-mail: nguyen@management.mcgill.ca

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Student Paper
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ABSTRACT

Four configurations of change navigation styles are proposed to synthesize the literature on planned change: Designing, Programming, Converting, and Animating. Four temporal dimensions are included: timing, sequencing, pacing, and duration. The performance implications of these four styles and their temporal characteristics are discussed in the context of corporate revitalization.

Key words: organizational change; time; revitalization
Change scholars have consistently deplored that the literature on the management of change has been largely atheoretical (Tichy, 1983: 412; Pettigrew, 1985: 23; Hendry, 1996: 621) and fragmented (Van de Ven, 1992: 174; Mintzberg and Westley, 1992: 57). As a result, we still know little about how to translate strategic intent into reality and can offer few useful prescriptions to struggling practitioners (Hardy, 1996: S13). Change theorists have tended to be narrowly focused on changing one particular organizational dimension such as culture (Schein, 1992), structure (Miller and Friesen, 1982), system (Senge, 1990), mindset (Argyris, 1993). Yet if the organization can be construed as a harmonious configuration of all these dimensions and strategy (Greenwood and Hinings, 1988; Miller, 1990), what happens when misalignment occurs as a result of change in one organizational dimension? Is the approach suggested for changing one particular organizational dimension compatible with the approaches prescribed for other dimensions?

This article offers an integrative conceptual framework to synthesize various managerial change actions, and to outline the theoretical assumptions underlying each change approach. It will elaborate and extend the typology of strategic implementation approaches suggested by Bourgeois and Brodwin (1984) and the types of change discussed by Stace and Dunphy (Stace, 1996) in regard to underpinning theoretical assumptions, variety and temporality of deliberate change actions. The proposed framework draws from the theoretical and empirical literature on change, that is, mainly longitudinal studies with relatively detailed processual description of change activities and the contexts in which these activities were embedded. The survey of longitudinal studies in not meant to be exhaustive but rather illustrative of various change approaches and outcomes that have been recorded. The scope of my arguments will be restricted to strategic change and corporate revitalization in the context of large and mature organizations.
More specifically, I suggest that most deliberate strategic change actions in organizations can be understood and reconciled by using four configurations of ‘planned’ change navigation styles associated with their temporal dynamics. Change navigation more accurately describes the complex nature of the change dynamics and the required flexibility and mindfulness of change agents. Navigation focuses on the temporal dimensions of change, namely, timing, sequencing, duration, and pacing. The likelihood of change adoption depends not only on the selection of the navigation style appropriate to the organizational context (timing), but also on the order in which various styles are applied (sequencing), the rhythm (pacing), as well as the length in time (duration) of each style. Like captains who have to maneuver their ships through stormy seas with capricious winds and undercurrents, agents of change should be continually alert to shifting conditions both inside and outside the firm and tactically change the direction and pace of change if need be. They have to zigzag their way to the final destination as the path of change is often indeterminate, precarious, and reversible (Pettigrew, Ferlie, & McKee, 1992: 297). From this perspective, ‘change management’ is an oxymoron.

This article extends a small but growing literature that incorporates time as an essential element of the change process (Eisenhardt, 1989a; Gersick, 1989). Brown and Eisenhardt (1997) found that certain organizations were capable of continuous innovation because they had structured ‘links in time’ processes that bridged the present to the future and provided direction and rhythm. Similar to Gersick’s (1994) research finding, time-paced changes entrained organizations to their environment and allowed them to set proactively the strategic direction of their industries. Event-paced change tends to induce only reactive change (1997: 25). These studies tend to focus on product innovation. The present article extends the temporal dimensions to the dynamics of large-scale strategic change. I will attempt to explain why and how the temporal dimensions have important performance implications by linking
them to the content of change (e.g., structure, culture, task, relationships), to the context (organizational slack and skill that determine the level of pressure and capability to change, respectively), and to the managerial processes (navigation styles). I will offer some building blocks toward the development of an evolutionary theory of strategic change incorporating both the pace and path of change (Barnett and Burgelman, 1996: 6).

The article is organized as follows. First, I will suggest a typology of four main change navigation styles and their underlying theoretical assumptions, which will allow me to expose the temporal characteristics of each style. Each style addresses a particular content and context of change. Second, I will propose a contingency framework that links these various navigation styles in time and in context (sequencing). The proposed framework is deduced from a limited number of published longitudinal and processual studies listed in the Appendix and needs further empirical exploration and testing.

FOUR CONFIGURATIONS OF CHANGE NAVIGATION STYLES

It will be argued that change navigation styles form distinct configurations based on genesis and context, where various elements cluster together to achieve consistency in their characteristics, synergy in their processes, and harmony with their situation (Miller and Friesen, 1984: 21). Genesis relates to the fundamental nature of the change style itself whereas context refers to the organizational context where a particular style is likely to be more effective and efficient than others.

Genesis of Navigation Styles

It is suggested here that change navigation styles can be distinguished along two dimensions: comprehensiveness and focus. Comprehensiveness relates to the level of generality of the change content. For example, an attempted change in the organizational structure or culture is likely to be
more general and conceptual than a change in specific work processes or working relationships among individuals and groups (Mintzberg and Wesley, 1992: 40). The second dimension, focus, relates to the basic nature of the change content itself. On a comparative basis, certain organizational dimensions are more tangible and more easily manipulable than others. For instance, formal structures and systems or work processes are considered instrumental or objective entities; alternatively, culture and relationships are categorized as social or subjective entities. Table 1 presents the navigation styles and their associated content of change. The latter relates in a large part to the alterable work settings subsystems identified by Robertson et al. (1993: 621). The reasons for the labeling of these styles will be discussed in the presentation of each style and are summarized in Table 4.

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Insert Table 1 about here
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A Contingency Framework: the Organizational Context of Power and Knowledge

Whereas genesis defines the nature of the primary content of change targeted by the navigation styles, I will argue that the appropriateness of each style depends on the dynamic organizational context. More specifically, this context is defined by the change agents’ relative influence in creating and diffusing new knowledge inside the organization they seek to change—which relates to power distribution—as well as to the primary process by which organizations create new knowledge during a particular phase of change—which relates to knowledge acquisition or modes of knowing. These dimensions are not static but can continuously shift under the interaction of both internal and external forces.
Power distribution, or the extent to which power is dominated (unitary) or divided (pluralistic), relies on Mintzberg's (1983) conceptualization of power configurations. The definition of power itself is based on the elaboration provided by Hardy (1996) and Lukes (1974). Knowledge acquisition draws from the dual view of organizations as knowledge systems, as suggested by Spender (1996) in his development of “a dynamic knowledge-based theory of the firm.” I have simplified the representation by dichotomizing both dimensions, which in reality should be continuous variables.¹

The context of power distribution. The conventional divide between political and cultural compliance can be reconciled by adopting a more encompassing view of power theory proposed by Hardy (1996). Drawing from Lukes’s (1974) elaboration of power, Hardy suggests that power can be exerted through the three levers of resources, processes, and meanings. Power tends to be traditionally defined as the ability to get others to do what you want them to, if necessary against their will. Through the first lever, power stems from one’s ability to control scarce resources that represent key uncertainties for the organization (Crozier, 1963; Pfeffer and Salancik 1978; Thompson, 1967). The second lever of power excludes certain issues from the agenda and from decision making through control over organizational processes, routines and procedures, thereby allowing behind-the-scenes manipulation by influential figures (Bachrach and Baratz, 1962). The third lever of power is even more subtle, where influence is exerted on sensemaking and meaning interpretation (Lukes, 1974). Values and preferences are shaped so that individuals cannot visualize any better alternative than the status quo. Two perspectives of power distribution can be established.

1-The Dominated Coalition (or unitary) view: the organization is assumed to be monolithic, with a single group wielding significantly more power over the organization than all of the others to

¹ As Pepper (1942) argues, the distinction of forms in typologies stems from a ‘formistic’ type of thinking that assumes that the conceptual categories are discrete, separate, and stable when they seldom are. Typology allows simplification and categorization for the benefit of more analytic order and clarity but can also leave out important nuances.
effect strategic change. The collective mind of the organization is inseparable from the cognition of the
dominant coalition, which often represents the CEO and his close associates. The Dominated Coalition
view is often espoused in the early strategy literature, especially by the planning and design school
(e.g., Ansoff, 1965; Andrews, 1971) and certain organizational development (OD) planned change
models (e.g., Beckhard and Harris, 1977).

2-the Divided Coalition (or pluralist) view: the power to affect the outcome of strategic change
is dispersed among many groups. Interest groups may form around particular objectives, task
specialties, issues of the day, ideologies, or status systems. These groups are likely to display different
perceptions of values, priorities, and behavioral styles. Thus the outcome of strategic change can be
construed as the interactive result of different competitive rationalities involved in political processes.

Two perspectives on organizations as knowledge systems. Spender’s theory of knowledge
(1996: 49) suggests there are two modes of knowing: one is based on reason and is rooted in the
Platonist philosophical tradition; the other is based on experience and draws its roots from Aristotelian
empiricism. The former is more concerned with universal truth and tends to adopt a positivistic
epistemology. The latter is more pragmatic and pursues functional, partial, local truths. These
distinctions lead Spender (1996: 55) to propose two views of organization: (1) a system of applied
abstract knowledge and (2) a system of knowing activity with emergent characteristics.

The first perspective emphasizes codification of models and rules under the form of ‘if ... then’
declarative statements. Knowledge can be formalized, explicit, and detached. Thus types of
environments are connected to types of strategic behavior in types of circumstances (Tsoukas,
1996:12). The future is assumed to be knowable, even predictable, which confers legitimacy to
planning activities. The ‘design’ and ‘planning’ schools in strategic management adopt this mode of
knowing (Mintzberg, 1990). The classical strategy literature often associates change in strategy with
change in structure (Chandler, 1990). Hence the label ‘Designing’ is attached to the change style that primarily focuses on general and instrumental organizational dimensions such as formal structures and systems, using dominated power and deductive knowledge. Similarly, the label ‘Converting’ is associated with the pattern of actions of change agents attempting to transform the organization’s general and social dimensions such as culture. Similar to religious missionaries, change agents have an *a priori* theory of beliefs and values about the truth they seek to impart to the change targets.

Thus, the first mode of knowing tends to be associated with sweeping, generic change. Deductive change posits that cognition precedes action and moves from the abstract to the concrete. For instance, strategic change would start with a change in vision and culture and systematically cascade down to changes in structures, positions, systems, programs, personnel and facilities (Mintzberg and Westley, 1992: 42).

In the second perspective, human action creates knowledge (Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995: 59), or action precedes cognition. The future is assumed to be indeterminate, unknowable (Stacey, 1995: 483). Knowledge is widely distributed in the organization. Firms can no longer be viewed as “assemblies of interrelated components,” but as “semi-autonomous organic systems” with some self-regulating capabilities (Spender, 1996: 56). The collective mind should be construed as a pattern of heedful interrelating actions by individuals. It is an emergent joint accomplishment. The collective mind is known in its entirety by no one, although portions of it are known differentially to all. It this sense, the collective mind is a distributed system (Weick and Roberts, 1993: 365). Firms faced with radical uncertainty do not nor cannot know what they need to know. Thus firms are not only distributed, but decentred systems – they lack the cognitive equivalent of a ‘control room’” (Tsoukas, 1996: 22).
The second mode of knowing tends emphasizes the tacit, customized, visceral experience acquired through doing (Polyani, 1966: 20-31; Tsoukas, 1996: 16-20). This mode tends to favor localized, specific, or inductive change, which proceeds from the concrete to the conceptual. Changes start at the specific, tangible level, such as work processes or relationships among individuals or small groups. I have labeled the change style that primarily focuses on tasks and work processes ‘Programming’ to denote the concrete yet highly analytical nature of the change process. Many hitherto tacit tasks have to be analyzed then optimized. The ‘Animating’ style refers to change in social-technical relationships among work groups where the change agent acts mainly as a role model and facilitator. Here the change agent seeks to improve the collective learning skills among the members of the work groups by attending to intra and sometimes inter-group relationships.

Table 2 summarizes the key distinctions between the two views of organizations as knowledge systems. The above dichotomy is necessary for conceptual clarity only. In practice, effective change agents should be able to apply various styles according to the specific contexts. A prescriptive framework for the sequencing of the four styles will be presented in the latter part of this article.

Each system exhibits distinct advantages and limitations. The applied knowledge system facilitates the diffusion of knowledge through explicit encoding and formalization. It may, however, experience more difficulty in dealing with uncertainty and change. Strategic planning under this mode is likely to yield mediocre results (Mintzberg, 1994). Tacit knowledge under the knowing activity system confers competitive advantage to organizations since it is difficult to copy (Grant, 1991), but it may be also barely visible to other groups in the same organization. It includes taken-for-granted assumptions and may foster ignorance or cultural conformity, which impedes breakthrough innovation (Hendry, 1996: 635).
The interaction of power distribution and knowledge acquisition modes yield four distinct contexts for the appropriate use of particular change navigation styles, each with its own assumptions and intervention theories. This is outlined in Table 3.

The model described in Table 4 builds on Dunphy’s (1996: 543) suggestion of the constitutive elements of a comprehensive change theory. Table 4 lists the broad definitional elements of each navigation style whereas Table 5 summarizes the contingency implications of each style with regard to its execution involving: the context of organizational power and knowledge and slack availability that influences the appropriate timing of each style; the typical content of change; its associated level of difficulty and goal temporality; the temporal dynamics associated with the execution of each style, such as duration and pacing.

The Designing Navigation Style

Here cognition precedes action. This is reflected in many of the design (Andrews, 1987), planning (Ansoff, 1965), and positioning (Porter, 1980) schools of strategy. A change of mental
perspective has to take place first. A shared ideology is necessary to bring consistency to organizational actions. This is reflected in much of the so-called literature on planned strategic change, where as clear a vision as possible is required to initiate a major change process. Prescient and comprehensive planning is assumed to be possible. For instance, Beckhard and Harris (1987) prescribe in detailed steps how to manage complex change in complex organizations. Careful planning and diagnosis are mandated, congruent with Ansoff’s (1965) strategic planning framework. Power is concentrated with one single group (unitary) that tends to be situated at the top of the formal hierarchy. The tactic used is predominantly power-coercive (Chin and Benne, 1994: 132), which emphasizes political and economic sanctions as well as moral power to arouse feelings of guilt and shame (Ansoff, 1988: 214). The CEO’s style is directive, with compliance as the goal, like the behavior of a military commander. The theories-in-use are indoctrination (Selznick, 1957), manipulation (Quinn, 1980), or elimination (Biggart, 1977). The Designing style is manifested under several variations, the directive, the coaxing, or the charismatic styles.

**Designing-directive style.** The top managers know where they are going. They believe they have a reasonably clear vision at the start of the change process. Allaire and Firsirotu (1985) suggest a “meta-strategy” of radical change. The future environment is assumed to be knowable through systematic analysis of environmental factors (Porter, 1980) and the organization has to change to align itself with the future state. The rest of the organization is assumed to be tightly coupled—like a compliant machine (Morgan, 1986: 19). The means used are dominantly structural, such as change of senior executives, reorganization, downsizing, consolidation, acquisitions, and outsourcing. Simplification strategies—a return to the core business—tend to be applied (Grinyer and McKiernan, 1990: 140).
The Designing-directive style bears close affinity with Selznick’s (1957) process theory of institutional creation. Selznick recommends a high degree of centralization in the early stages of institutional development, with centralization gradually decreasing as the homogeneity of personnel increases (113). Care has to exercised in the initial recruitment of members, whose homogeneity will help indoctrinate newcomers with desired values (104-105). Isolation of the elite is suggested during periods of incubation and maturation of values to shield them from external pressure, until these values become entrenched enough to withstand external diversion (123). For them to be effective change agents, this elite has to be a closed, homogeneous group of individuals set in their own convictions and impervious to external influence. This elite will in turn recruit and indoctrinate those who will be determined as suitable members of the new institution, and “purge” those who seem resistant to indoctrination. The change style is centralized and directive, which prevailed in the formation processes of the Bolsheviks communist party from which the author derived some of his theoretical insights (122).

At the risk of oversimplifying, the directive style can be exerted through two levers: sanction or inspiration. The first lever uses formal structures and systems to coerce and control compliance (Simons, 1994). The second lever uses inspiration to mobilize ‘unquestioned’ adherence to the change leader and his vision. A leader with charisma would tend to use the second lever to rouse support for the proposed change (Mintzberg and Wesley, 1992; Nadler and Tushman, 1990). Both have limitations. The sanction approach can evoke strong resistance and backlash. The inspiration approach develops the organization’s dependency on a single person. Both are likely to produce mostly superficial change (Stace, 1996: 562). And both levers are not-sustainable over the long run: people overthrow long-term coercive dictators; charisma is rare, declines over time, and becomes anachronistic. Therefore, this style is likely to enjoy maximum efficacy when it is executed in a rapid
and abrupt pace, and when the duration of its execution is relatively short in order not to stretch the patience and tolerance of those affected by an autocratic regime, as well as to shorten the time for an organized resistance to change to gather momentum.

The directive mode can manifest itself through various possible actions:

a) **Jolt**: Some quick and highly visible actions are taken to signify the start of a new state in the organization. These actions are highly symbolic and relatively simple to implement, such as changes in membership in the top management team, change in the corporate logo, announcement of a new strategy, changes in formal organizational structures and reward systems. These actions seek to realign the formal power structure, instill a sense of urgency, evoke hopes and fears, and give momentum to the sequence of change actions that are to follow (Dickhout, Denham, & Blackwell et al., 1995: 103).

b) **Turnaround**: change actions relate mostly to operating turnaround strategies or first-order strategic change. The focus is on improving the efficiency of existing operations, financial restructuring, asset optimization, and simplifying the existing portfolio of business domains. Various restructuring initiatives are launched, such as outsourcing, divestment, downsizing, improving production capacity, as well as seeking to increase revenues from the existing portfolio of products and services through various marketing actions. These changes affect mostly the formal structures and systems and are relatively easy to implement and control for top managers.

As an illustration of the Designing-directive style, Pettigrew (1985) describes the “long and meandering” process—it took around a decade—of convincing the Board members of ICI to change. But once Chairman Jones got formal power, changes made to the rest of the organization went swiftly. In 4 years, close to 30,000 employees lost their jobs. Many divisions were consolidated. Resistance to change may exist, but is not crucially relevant since it can be dealt with coercive power if necessary. In
the case of the Post Office, the CEO mounted a frontal attack on the rest of the organization, much as Jack Welsh did to GE in his initial years as CEO (Tichy and Sherman, 1994). Blount, the new Postmaster General, considered that “the most potentially powerful enemies were his own employees” (Biggart, 1977: 417). Thus he used a series of actions that “abolishes, discredits, suppresses, or otherwise renders useless an organization structure” (410). As shown in the Appendix, the number of empirical studies reporting the use of this style is relatively large, which may attest the popularity of this style with practitioners. This style seems to be appropriate where the goals of change are clear and easily realizable or the time for action is constrained. The previous discussion can be summarized under the following proposition.

**Proposition:** The Designing-directive navigation style is effective and efficient when the configuration of all the following factors is present: the main content of change is formal structures and systems; the change agents have sufficient knowledge of the organization to apply this style of change; the context of power is strongly dominated by change agents; the pressure to change is high; the pacing of its execution is rapid and the duration is short.

**The Designing-coaxing style.** A variant of the pure Designing-directive style is the Machiavellian, coaxing style. Here the top managers have a general idea of the vision, but needs collaboration from other groups, which tend to be in the middle part of the hierarchy, to come up with the ‘implementation’ specifics. Use of brute coercive power is risky for implementation success. Several manipulative tactics are possible:

a) Co-opt middle managers through the lure of more personal power, status, and economic gain. This comes from the top managers’ realization that there are too many people in these complex organizations and senior managers have no realistic means of controlling directly all the organization. Bower (1986) even goes further by arguing that senior management cannot directly make strategic
choices and is limited to choosing among the range of alternatives proposed by middle managers who
know the operational details and are thus better positioned to perform the integration task (288-300).
Senior managers can only exert their influence indirectly though the establishment of an appropriate
context (structure and systems) and careful selection of their subordinates via the latter’s “track record”
(71, 287).

b) Manufacture an artificial crisis by inventing an ‘external enemy’ who threatens the survival of the
firm, an approach used by many political leaders throughout history (Ansoff, 1988: 216), or raising
performance expectations and holding subordinates accountable for achieving them (Simons, 1994),
much like Jack Welsh requiring the GE divisions to be first or second in their respective markets
(Tichy and Sherman, 1994).

This coaxing style is partly rooted in Barnard’s (1968) exchange theory, which holds that
cooperation can be achieved by maintaining a dynamic balance between organizational inducements
and individual contributions (94). By acknowledging the power and desirability of the informal
organization to supplement the formal organization (122), Barnard implicitly recognizes the limited
power of formal authority. Thus the authority of an executive order “lies with the persons to whom it is
addressed”, not with the persons who issue these orders (163). The executive has to induce the
followers to accept his authority by showing them a net personal advantage. “The existence of a net
inducement is the only reason for accepting any order as having authority” (166). In order to preserve
their symbolic formal authority, experienced executives will not issue orders “that cannot or will not
be obeyed” (167). Competent executives have to be able to sense the varying width of the “zone of
indifference” in which they can navigate, the width being mainly determined by the assessment of the
degree to which the individual’s inducements exceed the “burdens and sacrifices” of him demanded by
the organization's task (169). This Barnardian style closely resembles the decision making style of Wrapp's (1967) managers.

The Designing-coaxing style seems appropriate in contexts where organizations' performance pressures are present but not overwhelming. Some intermediate time horizon to conduct a more evolutionary, incremental change is possible as a moderate amount of slack is still available. Senior managers do not have to risk bold actions that can alienate or endanger the whole organization, and seek to co-opt the involvement of other groups to conduct a more evolutionary transformation (Dickhout et al., 1995: 102).

An illustration of the Designing-coaxing style is provided by Quinn (1978). Here the top managers are wise enough to recognize the existence of "cognitive limits" and "process limits" (17). This is not "muddling" but the "purposeful, effective, proactive management technique" advocated by Lindblom (1959). Sharing some power with middle or divisional general managers is highly rational and instrumental. Executives hide their true intentions and wait for a consensus to emerge from the political struggle below them. "Through their information networks they can encourage concepts they favor, let weakly supported options die through inaction, and establish hurdles or tests for strongly supported ideas with which they do not agree but which they do not wish to oppose openly" (Quinn, 1980: 11). The idea here is that the concept or change goal can be radical, but the implementation steps have to be incremental and opportunistic. Executives minimize their chance of "losing personal credibility" in case of failure (1980:10). Doz and Prahalad (1988) found that the change manager had a relatively clear vision from the start but did not possess a detailed game plan as to how to "manipulate the organization and its members" (77). Instead, s/he planned only a few steps at a time, using the local rationale to bring about cognitive shift through a series of subtle but timely changes and through alternate use of minor power shifts, management tools, and formal
structures (78). This style of change is also reflected in other empirical studies on major change listed in the Appendix, such as Greiner and Bhambri (1989) and Gioia and Chittipendi (1991).

**Proposition:** The Designing-coaxing navigation style is effective and efficient when the configuration of all the following factors is present: the main content of change is formal structures and systems; the change agents do not have sufficient knowledge of the organization to apply this style of change on their own; the context of power is moderately dominated by change agents; the pressure to change is moderate; the pacing of its execution is gradual and the duration is relatively long.

**The Converting Navigation Style**

The previous Designing-coaxing style constitutes an intermediate step between the hard and fast Designing-directive style and the softer and gradual Converting style. The Converting style is underpinned by OD theories and action research interventions. According to Stace (1996: 559), OD proponents believe that collaboration and consultation constitute optimal change approaches. Rooted in the Human Relations approach, OD suggests a careful, deliberative, wide participation approach to change. Many of the OD theories of intervention assume preconceived reasons for organizational ineffectiveness and specific ways to remedy these dysfunctions. Abstract knowledge is thus applied to large groups of people in a voluntary, participative mode. Moreover, cognitive and attitudinal change is assumed to precede behavioral change. Thus a normative-reeducative approach (Chin and Benne, 1994: 119-120) is adopted which focuses on changes in beliefs, meanings, habits, and values. Individuals must participate in their own reeducation through the active intervention of change agents, based on Lewin's advocacy of action research and voluntary participation in groups as a medium of reeducation. Change targets are no longer as passive or compliant as in the Designing
mode: they collaborate in effecting their own *personal* change. The goal is to build commitment though cognitive change, not just compliance.

This approach has been taken up by many noted scholars, such as Likert, Maslow, Mayo, and McGregor. By probing feelings, the change agents can bring to the surface the relationship difficulties in the client systems (Chin and Benne, 1994: 122). Interventions seek to develop trust, empathy, openness, and caring behavior through training groups. To maintain congruency, the CEO’s role should be supportive and empathic; s/he can be expected to play the role of a philosopher-psychologist, competent in interpersonal inquiry skills, and comfortable in sharing control and his own weaknesses (Beer and Eisenstat, 1996: 616-7).

Drawn from Edmonson’s (1996) review of organizational intervention research, three current intervention approaches from three established scholars will be compared here to illustrate the potential contributions and limitations of the Converting style: Schein’s (1992) culture diagnosis, Senge’s (1990) system dynamics, and Argyris’s (1993) theory of action. They are summarized in Table 6.

Congruent with the view of an organization as a system of applied abstract knowledge, all three approaches share a definite theory of organizational *ineffectiveness*: all believe that cognitive dysfunctionality is the root cause, that is to say, taken-for-granted assumptions of organizational actors lead to unintended consequences (Edmonson, 1996: 590). Schein seeks to elicit the tacit, shared assumptions of the organization’s culture. Senge tries to map the organization’s structure as complex dynamic systems in order to uncover vicious causal loops and decision makers’ erroneous mental causal attributions. Argyris intervenes to demonstrate incongruency between ‘espoused theories’ and ‘theories-in-use’. All three believe in sound, cognitive diagnosis of root causes as a prelude to changing actions. They also believe that *outsider* intervention is necessary to convert the tacit causes of
in implementing strategic realignment.” Quinn, Brown, and Spreitzer (1997: 9) observe that “despite the rhetoric of the day, normative-educative approaches are still poorly understood and sparsely employed.” The few objective research studies on large-scale planned change using the Converting style listed in the Appendix showed qualified success (e.g., Beer & Eisenstat, 1996; Stace, 1996). Thus,

Proposition: The Converting navigation style is effective and efficient when the configuration of all the following factors are present: the main content of change is cultural values and norms; the change agents have sufficient knowledge of the organization to apply this type of change; the pressure to change is moderate; the pacing of its execution is gradual and the duration is long.

Note that the power context is not mentioned in this proposition as change agents may deliberately share power during this phase of change even if they have full power in order for the application of this style to succeed.

The Programming Navigation Style

Here the focus is on changing the concrete operating work processes of the organization. The view of the organization as a knowing system of activity prevails. The organization in this perspective comes closest to Morgan’s (1986: 85, 96) metaphor of ‘brains’, which reflects a complex network of interconnected neurons—work systems—with self-regulating and self-learning capabilities involving negative feedback.

This perspective holds that one should first focus on changing operational tasks and processes; this induces behavioral change that will be followed by gradual value change. In this sense, action
ineffectiveness into explicit formulations, as the organization members are cognitively limited and trapped by their own hidden assumptions. In this perspective, they hold the view of organizations as “psychic prisons” (Morgan, 1986: 199) and action researchers as ‘liberators’. Change agents should be trained in process consulting and psychological analysis.

Yet each of these theories is limited in its own way when it comes to bringing about actual change. Schein assumes that once defective shared assumptions are brought to the surface, change would be automatic. He ignores the political implications of various coalitions vying for control of the organization and the importance of strategy, structures, and systems. Senge’s focus on system relationships ignores the participants’ lack of power to carry out system-wide changes as well as the defensiveness aroused by such revelations. Argyris’s focus on interpersonal dynamics does not provide for a systematic way to diagnose macro organization-specific symptoms (Edmonson, 1996: 591).

This navigation style demands great patience, a long time horizon, and it may lead to strategic drift and unresolvable conflicts among warring coalitions. In actual practice, this style puts more emphasis on spreading and stabilizing change than experiential learning (Hendry, 1996: 628). The effectiveness of this style with respect to strategic realignment is often ambiguous: focus on building new values does not necessarily lead to strategic realization. Changes in cultural norms and values can seldom be decreed. Hence the power distribution context becomes less relevant, because change agents cannot unilaterally impose a new culture on the organization and hope to sustain it even if they wield all the power in the world. Deep and real cultural change is largely a gradual and voluntary process.

Beer and Eisenstat (1996: 599-600) observe that although theory suggests that the change process ought to be systemic (i.e., multi-dimensional), open (to reduce politics and defensive routines), and participatory (wide inclusion of stakeholders), these prescriptions are “rarely reflected in actual intervention practice … [as a result,] little empirical data exists about the problems organizations face
precedes cognition. Here the change tactic used can be termed *empirical-rational*, where the change target is supposed to be rational and moved by self-interest: a rational justification of the potential personal benefits of the proposed changes is thus sufficient (Chin and Benne, 1994: 113). Power is centralized in a single group of leader-experts. The change agent should be skilled in work process analysis and organization design. The CEO should play the role of a teacher, guiding and developing the subordinates’ task skills. The proposed changes often make sense because they are concrete and the role definition of each worker is clear. The need for an abstract vision is less acute. This style can be mixed with the Converting approach (Stace, 1996: 562).

In a curious way, this school is at least in part rooted in Frederick Taylor’s *Scientific Management* principles. Taylor (1911) focuses on improving the execution of concrete work tasks. Taylorist managers or staff analysts dictate the design of the work processes and thus enact the unitary power perspective. The systems of knowledge rely largely on the tacit knowledge of workers, and Taylor suggests ways to systematically uncover this tacitness and convert it into explicit knowledge for ease of standardization. Taylor also believes that workers are primarily self-interested and as a result prescribes immediate, personal, and tangible economic rewards (1911: 95). Change should be carried out very slowly at the start; each individual worker should see concrete improvement in their tasks and personal prosperity; each should be thoroughly convinced about the advantages of the proposed change (132). Change in mental attitude would follow and propagate itself.

By suggesting systematic study of the best workers (1911: 117), Taylor is the father of future benchmarking and best-in-class studies. Only the level and scope of the studies have changed. Taylor’s initial focus on making mechanical, individual labor more efficient has extended to wider organizational business processes. This is essentially what process reengineering experts (Hammer and Champy, 1993) have advocated almost a century later. “Reengineering is about rethinking the
organization of work” (1993: 221). Departmentalized, fragmented tasks become again multidimensional, integrated, and adapted to local requirements. Performance is likewise measured on result, not activity. Measurement and reward systems shape the formation of new values (1993: 95). Change in work enables change in behavior, which gradually leads to change in values (Champy, 1995: 11).

Perhaps the greatest challenge to and resulting high failure rate of reengineering lie in the explicit denial of the largely tacit, social and interrelated nature of many tasks: no satisfactory mechanism has been found to extrapolate and integrate the tacit and the explicit in a mechanized system. As much as the Converting style often over-emphasizes the human dimensions at the expense of strategy and task performance, the Programming style is doing the exact opposite. Excessive focus on concrete tasks may overlook the softer aspects of humanity. Michael Hammer now admits he under-appreciated the human dimension in his reengineering model (White, 1996: 1).

The Programming style may also foster incremental changes and reinforce the autonomy and parochialism of business units at the expense of corporate-wide integration and cooperation. Miller and Friesen’s (1984: 141) T5 (centralization, boldness, abandon) transition archetype would approximate this style and reveal its potential dangers. Senior managers over time become more self-confident and risk-taking. Entrepreneurship sets in, various experimentations and ‘pet’ projects are conducted. Gradually, integration declines and the company as a whole becomes less adaptive as it becomes more inward-focused and impulsive. The potential benefits are described in the transition archetype T2--entrepreneurial revitalization--(1984: 133) where the CEO implements more technocratization, intelligence systems, and delegation to lower levels to stimulate greater innovation and pro-activeness.

The Programming style can take the form of three tactics:
- *Small-win*: localized task improvement (in small plants or business units) aimed at building task skills, teamwork, and self-confidence;

- *Experimentation*: encouraging widespread experimentation to foster emergence of a breakthrough strategy;

- *Systemic*: major corporate wide redesign to achieve systemic integration through core reengineering and designing new structures and systems (e.g., lateral structures--Galbraith, 1994; reward and control systems --Simons, 1994; Doz and Prahalad, 1988).

An illustration of the Programming navigation style is reflected in the model of change proposed by Beer, Eisenstat, and Spector (1990) for corporate revitalization. They argue that design and corporate-wide changes imposed from the top or corporate groups tend to fail. Change has to start at the periphery and has to focus first on mundane, concrete task behavior. Changes in attitudes and mindset will eventually follow. These authors recognize the role of strong leadership, albeit at the SBU level. General managers (division ‘CEOs’) mobilize their employees to develop a vision centered on concrete work processes and enhance coordination to achieve task objectives. Changes in formal structures and systems have to be last, once adequate learning has taken place to figure out the optimal structure. Resistance to change is minimized because changes are concrete and meaningful down to the individual job level. These authors also caution that they have yet to observe a successful diffusion of an isolated, relatively small SBU’s *small win* (less than 2000 employees) to the whole corporation, or even to a major part of the latter. They admit there may exist significant problems, such as the ‘Not-Invented-Here’ syndrome and political games among SBUs. There has been a growing body of evidence that successful pilot site experiments rarely spread, as their very success generates defensiveness and rejection by other business units claiming that they are different from the pilot site (Pettigrew et al., 1992: 295). Illustrations of this Programming style are also noted in the empirical
studies conducted by Meyer (1982), Webb and Dawson (1991), and Stace (1996) as shown in the Appendix. The previous discussion can be summarized in the following proposition.

**Proposition:** The Programming navigation style is effective and efficient when the configuration of all the following factors is present: the main content of change is work processes; the change agents need to rely on the tacit knowledge of the rest of the organization to apply this style of change; the context of power is moderately dominated by change agents; the pressure to change is moderate; the pacing of its execution is temperate and the duration is moderately long.

**The Animating Navigation Style**

This navigation style comes closest to Morgan’s (1986: 46) metaphor of organizations as organisms—interrelated systems open to their task-environment, able to self-regulate and evolve. This perspective assumes that power is equally distributed among various groups and individuals and that strategic change will emerge as a result of the learning processes among various groups. Knowledge, mostly of the tacit type, is embedded in the system itself. As a system of knowing activity, the organization is focused on task performance and oriented toward action as experimentation. Individuals are motivated to engage in autonomous behaviors because such action is congruent with their self-image, that is, their motivation may be rooted in an “obligatory logic” (March, 1988). Motivation can also be rooted in “consequential logic” (March, 1988), that is, individuals feel their change initiatives have favorable tradeoffs between rewards and risks in light of their capabilities and skills (Burgelman, 1990: 169).

None of the Chin and Benne’s (1994) planned change strategy corresponds adequately to this navigation style. The closest to it, the normative-reeducative approach, assumes that change in cognition and norms has to precede behavioral change. Change agents have to teach new norms to
targets of change without necessarily having to change themselves since change interventionists are assumed to be external or transient to the targeted social system (Quinn et al., 1997: 26).

The Animating style focuses on behavioral or task-relationship changes as a prelude to broader cognitive organizational change. Concrete change in values will take hold and diffuse only after tasks and relationships change. For this reason, I label this approach ‘empirical-normative’. Attention is devoted to developing the skills individuals need to adapt to new task requirements and relationships and to make a new technical system work. Experience is considered as an effective source of learning for adults and it is within groups that people learn to develop work roles. This approach is rooted in several change theories: Mary Parker Follett’s “law of the situation,” the social-technical system approach (Emery and Trist, 1973) and the empowering self-modification (ESM) model advanced by Quinn and colleagues (1997) as a fourth addition to Chin and Benne’s (1994) framework.

Back in the 1920s, Follett (1996) offered concepts relevant to the Animating navigation style. For Follett, conflict is a fact of life: she suggests creative integration of differences as a method of resolution superior to either domination or compromise. One way of achieving integration is to focus on the specific activity to be solved instead of theorizing over the issue; disagreement often disappears when one focuses first on the task at hand and the immediate action to be taken. Integration and selective participation according to the logic of the local situation should guide work relationships (220). The change agent plays the role of a social facilitator in work design issues.

Emery and Trist (1973) contend that attention to both task-technology and social dimensions is mandated to optimize the production system’s effectiveness. Adequate supply of special skills and an appropriate system of roles to provide mutually supportive task performance are at least as important, if not more important than friendship needs (1973: 218). The ideal organization can be construed as a democratic community of semi-autonomous work groups that cannot only self-regulate but are also
capable of continuous learning. This situated learning takes place in communities-of-practice and pertains to developing shared understandings about relationships and activities in a particular spatial and temporal context (Lave and Wenger, 1991). It involves linking formal knowledge with tacit skills in context, and the learning is simultaneously social, experiential, and cognitive. Members engage in task problem solving activities while reproducing and repairing the social context (Hendry, 1996: 628, 35).

Quinn et al.’s (1997) ESM model holds that effective change agents start a change effort first by changing their own behaviors. Regardless of the preparatory processes they may have to go through, such as a difficult period of self-questioning and cognitive change at the personal level, the critical result is that they are first able to change their behaviors and act according to the newly espoused values. Only by first changing themselves can they hope to attract others to change. Proponents of change become socially embedded in the target organization and have to act as role models. This is what Jesus, Martin Luther King, Jr., or Mahatma Gandhi did. This perspective assumes that “the most important sources of influence are relationships, not arguments, or reasons, or methods” (Thompson, 1988: 134) and that people can create their own reality. Change emerges slowly through a process of openness and mental liberation from the fear of external sanctions, where people empower themselves (Quinn et al., 1997: 32). Only by showing through repeated deeds that they deeply care for the welfare of the change targets can agents of change develop commitment to a collective vision.

All three perspectives hold that one should focus equally on task and task-related relationships. The change agent should be supportive yet at the same time maintain a firm focus on the task at hand. The CEO’s style should be democratic, seeking to develop synergy among various groups and guiding the change process in a cooperative mode. This style does not require top managers to have extraordinary foresight or a grand strategy. Instead, top managers should nurture an internal context
that correctly reflects external pressures and that also tolerates variation, divergences, and open debate about competing options. Yet top managers should also be able to recognize the right moment to officialize an emerging strategy and mobilize strategic action (Burgelman, 1994: 53). Strategy only becomes fully articulated ex post as its viability is already established in both the internal and external environment. As a result, strategy is a concept largely based on retrospective rationality (Burgelman, 1990: 168-9).

However, the potential danger of the Animating style could well be the risk of a splintered, anarchic state. Here a large number of factions focus on changing their own tasks with no resulting common direction. The lack of clear pressure from the top may facilitate foot-dragging behaviors by certain recalcitrant managers. The resultant of all these centrifugal forces could well be neutral at the organizational level. A lot of resources have been expended locally with no clear collective focus or outcome. As groups work at cross-purposes and fight one another for scarce resources, the organization 'spins its wheels.' Moreover, there is the danger that informal groups indulging in experiential learning may narrow competence, creativity, limit the range of options considered, and tend toward inertia (Hendry, 1996: 631). This may come close to the garbage-can view advanced by Cohen, March, and Olsen (1972).

This navigation style seems to be prevalent in organizations that are capable of continuous change (e.g., Mintzberg and McHugh, 1985; Burgelman, 1991 as listed in the Appendix). As an illustration, Brown and Eisenhardt’s (1997) research on innovative organizations found an apparent paradox of order and chaos: certain features of innovation projects were tightly prescribed and determined (e.g., responsibilities, priorities, deadlines), while other aspects were highly organic, with few rules and an unfettered design process (28). These project teams focused on current projects and developed a sense of direction through future probes (e.g., futurists, experimental products, strategic
alliances). Imitation by outsiders was difficult because one had to know what the critical tacit processes and the underlying logic of time-sequenced steps linking the present to the future were.

Westley (1990) describes an attempt at instituting social-technical values in a manufacturing plant. External consultants had been using the Converting style to ‘teach’ change targets new values with very little tangible progress. It was found that some insiders who were familiar with the old culture were more successful with the Animating style. They came up with grafting metaphors that helped bridge the relationships between the old and the goal culture and that made sense to the change targets at the personal level. Thus focusing on creating meaningful and specific relationships between the individual and the organization, between the old and the new values, might represent a promising way to initiate cultural change.

Proposition: The Animating navigation style is effective and efficient when the configuration of all the following factors is present: the main content of change is work relationships; the change agents need to rely strongly on the tacit knowledge of the organization to apply this style of change; the context of power is divided; the pressure to change is moderate to low; the pacing of its execution is leisurely and the duration is long.

SEQUENCING OF NAVIGATION STYLES IN CORPORATE REVITALIZATION

An important implication of the foregoing propositions is that skilled agents of change should keep a wide repertoire of change styles and understand the fundamental theoretical assumptions of each dominant navigation style. Each style constitutes a harmonious configuration of various elements related to the content, context, and process of change (Pettigrew, 1985). Large-scale transformation typically involves the alteration of many organizational dimensions. Yet one of the central theses of this article is that there is an optimal evolutionary path to revitalize the organization, depending on
what (content) needs to be changed, when to change it (timing and context), and how to change it (style, pacing, and sequencing). The implicit premise is that agents of change have to apply different styles according to various organizational change episodes to maximize the *effectiveness* and *efficiency* of the transformation effort. This framework focuses mainly on the *revitalization* of large, mature, and bureaucratic organizations; this goes beyond operating turnaround (efficiency, short-term focus) to include enhancement of organizational sustainable capabilities more centered on skills acquisition, organizational learning, and inter-functional and inter-divisional cooperation. Revitalization enhances competence, cooperation, and commitment which constitute three essential enablers for long term economic performance (Beer et al., 1990: 9).

Thus, large-scale corporate revitalization is more likely or faster if agents of change orchestrate their change efforts by gradually moving the organizations through various distinct states. The ultimate state to reach is ‘high slack and high capability to change’. Two conditions may arise: transformation by anticipation when the pressure for performance improvement is low to moderate, or transformation by reaction when the performance pressure is high.

**High Pressure for Performance Improvement**

Agents of change faced with an organization that is in a slack-deficient and skill-inadequate state may choose the quick Designing-turnaround mode to increase slack. Highly symbolic actions are used to jolt the organization. Once slack becomes adequate, the next navigation style should be Programming with small change projects diffused throughout the company to build skills and morale, and gradually moving to large systems reengineering once both skills and lateral coordination are well developed. Widespread experimentations are also encouraged to foster emergence of a break-through strategy. Adequate slack and hard task skills then allow application of the more decentralized Converting style to change cultural values. An ‘emotional context’ necessary for subsequent deeper
changes has to be nurtured (Doz and Thanheiser, 1996: 11). Finally, newly institutionalized norms ease the subsequent development of work relationships and autonomous work groups. These more subtle organic changes require collective ownership and mobilization that can be fostered with the Animating style.

For example, Stopford and Baden-Fuller (1990: 404-11) suggest that a firm should first simplify and refocus (Designing-turnaround) before building new skills and a ‘learning’ organization (with the Programming and Converting styles). Doing both concurrently would exceed the capacity of most firms to manage change efficiently. To rejuvenate a mature business in difficulty, the change leader in successful firms should start with Designing-jolt to unfreeze the organization, which is followed by a Turnaround tactic, through restructuring and simplification strategies. The next step is Programming, with substantial investment in new equipment and new organizational processes, to lower cost and increase differentiation simultaneously. Experimentation allows the firm to discover new products and new ways. The Converting style is then applied to build teamwork, initiate cross-training and build support systems to increase the synergistic benefits. Once this has been achieved, the organization can ‘re-complicate’ by expanding into new business domains. An analogous sequence of Designing then Converting and/or Animating style was used to achieve a reported successful turnaround at National Semiconductor (Miles, 1997), at GE with Jack Welsh (Sastry, 1996: 263), and in Australian public institutions (Stacey, 1996: 563-5). The Designing then Programming sequence was used in the reported revitalization of Facit Corporation (Starbuck, Greve, & Hedberg, 1978).

In a divided power structure, even if top management knows the business and is able to propose a compelling vision, the proposed change still has to be negotiated with other stakeholders’ groups. Thus, the navigation style cannot be consistently Designing-directive, even when the organization has to embark first on a painful operating turnaround mode. The risk of insurgency and the likelihood of
success of such a backlash is high in a dispersed power structure. Leaders of the proposed change can at best alternate between very short bursts of Designing-directive tactics and longer and softer styles such as Designing-coaxing or Converting. Leaders of change have to constantly monitor the mood of the organization and vary the decision making process accordingly. For instance, Child and Smith (1987: 588-91) describe a long change process oscillating between a coercive, confrontative Designing-directive style with trade unions and a Converting style that sought to develop consent, consultation, and incremental adjustment. The outcome was reported as successful.

**Low Pressure for Performance Improvement**

An organization with moderate slack and under low performance pressure can start a large-scale transformation effort with a Converting or an Animating style. Once new values or work relationships are established, changes in other organizational dimensions such as structures and systems will follow with a swift and transient Designing style. For example, Bartunek’s (1984) study of a religious order describes how leaders guided the sensemaking process of the base organizational patiently and with sensitivity. These leaders understood the emotional fear and uncertainty of not finding a new, shared, and acceptable interpretive scheme, and allowed the wide consultative process to stretch over a decade. Once the religious members came to terms with newly reconciled values, the Designing style then followed to officialize a new consolidated structure. The same sequence was reported by Burgelman (1991) at Intel Corporation.

The previous discussion can be summarized under the following proposition.

*Proposition: Planned large-scale corporate revitalization is more likely to be realized when agents of change sequence different navigation styles according to various change phases.*

*Corollary 1: In organizational contexts where power is dominated by change agents and the pressure for performance is high, an effective and efficient path for corporate revitalization is*
associated with the following sequence of navigation styles: Designing, then Programming, then Converting, and finally Animating.

Corollary 2: In organizational contexts where power is divided and performance pressure is high, an effective and efficient path for corporate revitalization is associated with the following sequence of navigation styles: Converting, with very short bursts of the Designing and/or the Programming styles; followed by the Animating style when slack and skills become moderately adequate.

CONCLUSION

The field of organizational change has been locked in a sterile debate about “one-best-way” to effect planned large-scale organizational change. Certain strategy management researchers seem to favor a top-down, commander-like approach to implement sweeping, radical change (e.g., Allaire and Firsitrotu, 1985; Miller and Friesen, 1984). Researchers with a humanistic orientation tend to advocate a more voluntary, bottom-up approach (e.g., Beer et al., 1990; Schein, 1992). This article offers a contingency framework suggesting four distinct configurations of navigation styles and the context under which each of these styles is likely to be more effective and efficient. Empirical studies are used to illustrate the existence and application of each style. The proposed process framework provides practitioners with a more informed basis for selecting and sequencing their interventions than simply their personal values and preferences. Skilled agents of change should not favor one style of change over another but should rather vary the use of these four dominant styles in actual practice. Careless mixing of these four styles would breed confusion and inefficacy in the change efforts. Conversely, these four styles can be applied in the same organization with temporal or spatial separation; these navigation styles can be sequenced in time, or various styles can be applied concurrently in relatively independent units of the organization. The essential elements of this article have been summarized in
propositions that are amenable to future systematic testing and validation. The main contribution of this article lies in suggesting a relatively parsimonious framework to conceptualize different change methodologies, their underlying theoretical assumptions and temporal characteristics, as well as their performance implications in specific contexts. It suggests a step toward the development of a comprehensive and useful change process theory.
REFERENCES


### Appendix: Empirical Studies Categorized by Navigation Styles

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Authors</th>
<th>Navigation styles</th>
<th>Sample</th>
<th>Methodology</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Biggart (1977)</td>
<td>Designing-directive</td>
<td>1 (US Post Office)</td>
<td>longitudinal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chandler (1990)</td>
<td>Designing-directive</td>
<td>4 large US organizations</td>
<td>longitudinal-archival study</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demers (1993)</td>
<td>Designing-directive &amp; Converting</td>
<td>1 hydro-utility</td>
<td>longitudinal-part real time</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doz &amp; Thanheiser (1996)</td>
<td>Designing-turnaround</td>
<td>12 cases</td>
<td>longitudinal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gaertner (1989)</td>
<td>Designing-directive</td>
<td>1 medium-size information service firm</td>
<td>some interviews, mainly attitude surveys 2 yr. apart</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gioia et al. (1994)</td>
<td>Designing-directive</td>
<td>1 public research university</td>
<td>longitudinal-real time-participant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grinyer et al. (1990)</td>
<td>Designing</td>
<td>26 UK firms</td>
<td>cross-sectional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Simons (1994)</td>
<td>Designing-directive then Programming</td>
<td>10 firms with new CEOs using control systems</td>
<td>longitudinal-real time</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stace (1996)</td>
<td>Designing-directive (turnaround)</td>
<td>8 case examples- Australia</td>
<td>longitudinal-mixed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Designing-charisma</td>
<td>4 case examples- Australia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tichy &amp; Sherman (1994)</td>
<td>Designing-directive</td>
<td>1 (General Electric)</td>
<td>longitudinal-consultant’s account</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunstall (1985)</td>
<td>Designing-directive</td>
<td>1 (AT&amp;T’s divestiture)</td>
<td>longitudinal-practitioner’s account</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Whipp et al. (1989)</td>
<td>Designing-directive then Programming and Converting (?)</td>
<td>Jaguar (auto) and Hill Samuel (merchant bank)</td>
<td>longitudinal-retrospective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denis et al. (1996)</td>
<td>Designing-coaxing</td>
<td>1 large public hospital</td>
<td>longitudinal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doz and Prahalad (1988)</td>
<td>Designing-coaxing</td>
<td>16 multinational subsidiaries</td>
<td>longitudinal- some real time, some retrospective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greiner &amp; Bhambri (1989)</td>
<td>Designing-coaxing</td>
<td>1 gas distributor division</td>
<td>longitudinal, real time, action research</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Johnson (1988)</td>
<td>Designing-coaxing</td>
<td>3 retail clothing co.</td>
<td>longitudinal, part real time</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pettigrew (1985)</td>
<td>Designing-coaxing then Designing-directive</td>
<td>1 UK firm (ICI)</td>
<td>longitudinal, 8 yr. real time, 16 yr. retrospective</td>
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<td>Quinn (1980)</td>
<td>Designing-coaxing</td>
<td>10 major corporations</td>
<td>longitudinal, retrospective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authors</td>
<td>Navigation styles</td>
<td>Sample</td>
<td>Methodology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------</td>
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<td>------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beer &amp; Eisenstat (1996)</td>
<td>Converting</td>
<td>1 large global technology co.</td>
<td>action research</td>
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<td>Stace (1996)</td>
<td>Converting</td>
<td>6 cases- Australia</td>
<td>longitudinal-mixed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beer et al. (1990)</td>
<td>Programming</td>
<td>6 companies</td>
<td>longitudinal-all levels</td>
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<td>Hall et al. (1993)</td>
<td>Programming-systemic</td>
<td>20 reengineering projects</td>
<td>longitudinal consultants' study</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meyer (1982)</td>
<td>Programming - experimentation</td>
<td>3 hospitals</td>
<td>longitudinal-real time</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stace (1996)</td>
<td>Programming</td>
<td>6 case examples- Australia</td>
<td>longitudinal-mixed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Webb and Dawson (1991)</td>
<td>Programming mixed with Designing-directive</td>
<td>1 electronic MNC subsidiary- Scotland</td>
<td>longitudinal-retrospective</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bartunek (1984)</td>
<td>Animating then Designing</td>
<td>1 religious order</td>
<td>longitudinal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burgelman (1991&amp;1994)</td>
<td>Animating</td>
<td>Intel Corp.</td>
<td>longitudinal-mostly retrospective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hendry (1996)</td>
<td>Animating</td>
<td>1 medium size co.</td>
<td>action research</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mintzberg &amp; McHugh (1985)</td>
<td>Animating</td>
<td>1 film board-Canada</td>
<td>longitudinal-retrospective</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pettigrew et al. (1992)</td>
<td>Animating</td>
<td>National Health Service</td>
<td>longitudinal-real time</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Westley (1990)</td>
<td>Animating</td>
<td>1 Auto plant</td>
<td>action research (?)</td>
</tr>
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### TABLE 1
Genesis of Planned Change Navigation Styles

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Comprehensiveness</th>
<th>General</th>
<th>Specific</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Focus</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Objective (Instrumental)</td>
<td><strong>Designing</strong> (e.g., structure &amp; systems)</td>
<td><strong>Programming</strong> (e.g., work processes)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subjective (Social)</td>
<td><strong>Converting</strong> (e.g., culture)</td>
<td><strong>Animating</strong> (e.g., relationships &amp; learning skills)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### TABLE 2
Two views on organization as knowledge systems

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>System of applied abstract knowledge</th>
<th>System of knowing activity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Knowledge is objective and abstract</td>
<td>Knowledge is interpretive, concrete and practical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knowledge is codified in explicit formulation</td>
<td>Knowledge is embedded in social interaction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Focus is on explicit knowledge</td>
<td>Focus is on tacit knowledge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Future is predictable</td>
<td>Future is unknowable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cognition precedes action</td>
<td>Action precedes cognition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>deductive mode</td>
<td>inductive mode</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knowledge can be centralized</td>
<td>Knowledge is distributed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control can be centralized</td>
<td>Control is decentred</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### TABLE 3
Enabling Context for Navigation Style

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Power Distribution</th>
<th>Knowledge Acquisition</th>
<th>Applied Knowledge systems</th>
<th>Knowing Activity systems</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dominated Power (Unitary)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Designing</td>
<td>Programming</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Divided Power (Pluralist)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Converting</td>
<td>Animating</td>
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<tr>
<td>Navigation Style</td>
<td>Designing Style</td>
<td>Converting Style</td>
<td>Programming Style</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comprehensiveness</td>
<td>General</td>
<td>General</td>
<td>Specific</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Focus</td>
<td>Instrumental</td>
<td>Social</td>
<td>Instrumental</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Metaphor of organization</td>
<td>'Machine'</td>
<td>'Psychic prison'</td>
<td>'Brain'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Top management as machine operators; others are compliant mechanical parts</td>
<td>Members are well-meaning but cognitively deficient</td>
<td>System of interlocking activities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diagnostic Model</td>
<td>strategic analysis of environmental factors externally focused</td>
<td>analysis and surfacing of individuals’ hidden assumptions or erroneous causal models</td>
<td>work processes analysis and redesign</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideal organization</td>
<td>efficient and effective in terms of financial and productivity performance</td>
<td>community of responsible and mindful individuals learning in a trusting and open climate</td>
<td>well-designed and efficient work systems and structures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intervention theory</td>
<td>competitive analysis; strategic planning and repositioning design and implementation of integrated organizational change</td>
<td>expose shared tacit assumptions, taken for granted cause-effect relationships in organizational structures; surface interpersonal theories-in-use</td>
<td>work-process analysis and redesign, re-engineering, structure and systems realignment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change agent role</td>
<td>political strategist, expert in strategy implementation, integrator of various strategic action programs</td>
<td>skilled researcher, logician, process consultant</td>
<td>systems or process analyst, organization designer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change tactic</td>
<td>power-coercive</td>
<td>normative-reeducative</td>
<td>empirical-rational</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navigation Style</td>
<td>Designing Style</td>
<td>Converting Style</td>
<td>Programming Style</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>-------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONTEXT</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power distribution</td>
<td>Dominated</td>
<td>Divided</td>
<td>Dominated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mode of knowing</td>
<td>Applied abstract</td>
<td>Applied abstract</td>
<td>Knowing activity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slack availability</td>
<td>low</td>
<td>average at least</td>
<td>low to medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONTENT</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Typical content of change</td>
<td>Structure</td>
<td>Beliefs &amp; Values</td>
<td>Tasks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goal temporality</td>
<td>known change goal</td>
<td>long term goals</td>
<td>small-wins to boost morale</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PROCESS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Typical actions</td>
<td>restructuring, repositioning</td>
<td>culture/value building</td>
<td>local-segmented work-oriented change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEO change style</td>
<td>directive or coaxing</td>
<td>supportive</td>
<td>pedagogical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change goal</td>
<td>compliance</td>
<td>improvement</td>
<td>commitment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEO role</td>
<td>commander</td>
<td>philosopher-psychologist</td>
<td>teacher, coach expert</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEO theory-in-use with subordinates</td>
<td>indoctrinate, manipulate or eliminate</td>
<td>enhance cognitive skills</td>
<td>develop task-based skills</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Required attitude</td>
<td>firm resolution</td>
<td>sensitivity</td>
<td>patience</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change Targets role</td>
<td>obey orders</td>
<td>learn and improve</td>
<td>cooperate with experts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level of resistance to change</td>
<td>provokes anger and resistance</td>
<td>low resistance</td>
<td>localized, difficult to diffuse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level of difficulty</td>
<td>easily implementable</td>
<td>difficult</td>
<td>moderately difficult</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EXECUTION TEMPO</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pacing</td>
<td>abrupt, expeditious</td>
<td>gradual</td>
<td>temperate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duration</td>
<td>short (2-3 yrs)</td>
<td>long (5-10 yrs)</td>
<td>medium (3-6 yrs)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table 6: Comparison of three Converting change approaches

(adapted from Edmonson, 1996: 587, 592)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Primary source of ineffectiveness in organizations</th>
<th>( \text{Schein: culture diagnosis} )</th>
<th>( \text{Senge: system dynamics} )</th>
<th>( \text{Argyris: theory of action} )</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Shared tacit assumptions embedded in the culture</td>
<td>Counterproductive structures in the system, of which actors are unaware</td>
<td>Tacit theories-in-use employed in interpersonal interaction</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level of intervention</td>
<td>Cognitive: expose and change shared tacit assumptions</td>
<td>Cognitive: discover blindness to delays and unawareness of causal relationships within complex dynamic system</td>
<td>Cognitive: expose defensive theories-in-use and learn new ones.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subsequent corrective action</td>
<td>After participatory diagnosis, elicit participants’ help in challenging problematic assumptions</td>
<td>Find leverage points in system and attempt to change structure to reduce system irrationality</td>
<td>Teach participants new theories of action to increase their effectiveness in interpersonal dynamics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Possible limitations</td>
<td>Diagnosis reveals status quo; may not lead to ability to change organization; not connected to strategy</td>
<td>Participants lack ability or authority to change system; not connected to behavioral change skills or cultural barriers to change</td>
<td>Difficult to change deeply-held implicit theories-in-use; lack process to diagnose organization-specific culture and structure</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>